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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of a final summary judgment, a ruling in regard to a motion in
limine, a cross appeal in regard to setting aside a portion of a judgment by a successor
judge, and replacing such judgment with one of his own, and a ruling in regard to a case
closely related that was transferred from Davis County. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to UCA Section 78-2a-3(2)Q), Section 78-2-2(3)0) and Section 78-2a3(3).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The lower Court did not err in holding that a party cannot, as a matter of

law, establish possession of the property in support of an adverse possession claim, if he
leases the property to a tenant. This issue was preserved at R. 6549-6564. "Summary
judgment is only appropriate when 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and...the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Thus, summary
judgment involves only legal conclusions, which we review for correctness, according no
deference to the trial court." Martin v. Kearl, 917 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
2.

The lower Court did not err in refusing to grant summary judgment in favor

of David and Inez Allred on their adverse possession claim. This issue was preserved at
R. 4307-4332 and R. 6549-6564. Like the first issue, this issue is reviewed for
correctness under the summary judgment standard Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50
(Utah 1996).
3.

The lower Court did not err in concluding that David and Inez Allred's

causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, constructive trust, declaratory

judgment, and punitive damages are barred by the statute of limitations and that equitable
estoppel and the "special circumstances exception" did not bar the Allred Trusts' statute
of limitations defense. This issue was preserved below at R. 5402-5471, and is reviewed
for correctness.

RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-14. Possession of tenant deemed
possession of landlord.
When the relation of landlord and tenant has existed between any persons,
the possession of the tenant is deemed the possession of the landlord until
the expiration of seven years from the termination of the tenancy, or, where
there has been no written lease, until the expiration of seven years from the
time of the last payment of rent, notwithstanding that such tenant may have
acquired another title, or may have claimed to hold adversely to his
landlord; but such presumption cannot be made after the periods herein
limited.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-25. Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years;
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument
in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and
for any article charged on a store account; also on an open account for
work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that
action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within
four years after the last charge is made or the last payment is received;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of
Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent (a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which
in specific situations limits the time for action to one year, under Section
25-6-19; (b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or [c] Subsection 25-6-6(1)
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-26. Within three years.
An action may be brought within three years:...
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of
action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake;
2

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-7. Adverse possession Possession presumed in owner.
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof,
the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to
have been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the
occupation of the property by any other person shall be deemed to have
been under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the
property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven
years before the commencement of the action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs/Appellants are appealing from a summary judgment entered by the
Fourth District Court of Utah County, Utah, dismissing Plaintiffs' claims for breach of
fiduciary duty, fraud, constructive trust, punitive damages and declaratory judgment.
Plaintiffs' claim for adverse possession was precluded due to a ruling by the court on a
motion in limine precluding Plaintiffs from asserting that they had established adverse
possession through their tenant. As a matter of law, the tenant became the tenant of the
Trusts at the time the quitclaim deeds were executed in 1982 and 1983.
While Plaintiffs attempt to spin a compelling story, the facts, evidence, documents
and their witnesses do not support their claims. A brief statement of salient facts follows:
In 1974, David and Inez Allred, Plaintiffs, leased a piece of property known as the
"Provo property" to the telephone company in Provo, Utah. R. 2660-2662, 5367-5370.
In 1982, David Allred created nine irrevocable trusts for the benefit of his two sons
and their families and transferred the "Provo property" to those nine Allred Trusts. The
two quitclaim deeds used to transfer the "Provo property" were executed, notarized and
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recorded with the Utah County Recorder in December 1982 and February 1983. Add. B
In 1991, David Allred decided he wanted to give the same "Provo property" to the
L.D.S. Church. He approached the trustee of the nine Allred Trusts and asked that the
trustee sign the "Provo property" back. When the trustee explained that he could not
legally do so, David Allred began a demanding campaign to force the trustee, Richard
Allred, to sign the Provo property back to him.
David Allred even used deceit in claiming that he did not know that he did not own
the Provo property. The testimony of his personal attorney and the L.D.S. Foundation
representative would fully contradict David's story. David's own letters and meetings
with his attorney and the L.D.S. Foundation in 1991-1993 would contradict further his
ever changing story regarding the Provo property. Even now, Plaintiffs' Supreme Court
Brief, page 7, contains the unique new admission that perhaps David and Inez "had
forgotten about the deeds..."
Any allegation of wrongdoing on the part of trustee, Richard Allred, is quickly
dispelled when one examines the complete lack of evidence presented by Plaintiffs. No
evidence has been presented. No testamentary and no documentary evidence of
wrongdoing has been submitted to the Court. And, the Court has never ruled or indicated
that any wrongdoing occurred.
Additionally, when one compares the actual trust documents created by David
Allred in 1982, one finds that they are the very same identical trust documents [word for
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word, section for section] which David Allred used four years earlier in 1978 when he
created a trust for his daughter and her family wherein he conveyed a parcel of land to
them. R. 2677-2689. Addendum C.
Plaintiffs have, through a series of lies, misrepresentations, untrue allegations,
false accusations and innuendo, tried to create a story of betrayal by a son to his parents.
The untrue story was told, but no evidence was ever presented to substantiate it.
And then, as a back up argument in case no one believed their story, Plaintiffs in
2001, made their unsubstantiated claim of adverse possession against the Provo property.
No evidence, no documents, no prior mention of adverse possession or of any open,
hostile or notorious claim of ownership or any claim of actual or beneficial ownership, or
right to the proceeds of the rents was every mentioned prior to the filing of this lawsuit.
Rather, the only mention of the Provo property after 1991, were requests from Plaintiffs
asking the trustee to transfer title back to them.
Plaintiffs' case was filed in Utah County Fourth Judicial District Court. The trier
of fact heard the various allegations and arguments and saw and heard the evidence
presented by both sides. Two different judges were assigned to sit on this case during the
five year period it was before the Court. Rulings were made by both judges, and both
judges ruled that the "Provo property is owned by the trusts and the lease rents should be
paid to the trusts." R. 1207 Plaintiffs' Addendums A, B, and C. It is from those rulings
Plaintiffs now bring this appeal. They present no new evidence to prove their case, and
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no new law, but rather, after six years of litigation, now offer the words, "It was
understandable that David and Inez had forgotten about the deeds.,.". Plaintiffs'
Supreme Court Brief, page 7.
It should be noted that David Allred passed away at the age of 93 years in
December 2001, just ten months after this case was filed. He had been diagnosed with
age related dementia and was declared to be incompetent prior to the filing of this action.
Mr. Alfred's deposition was noticed for early July 2001, however, Plaintiffs' counsel
made a motion for a protective order based on Mr. AUred's mental incompetence.
Inez Allred, the only Plaintiff to testify, gave extremely conflicting testimony in
her various depositions, affidavits and erratas. She passed away December 2006.
Mary Allred Jensen, a daughter, was substituted in as a Plaintiff representing
David Alfred's estate. She is the successor trustee to David and Inez Alfred's personal
wills and trusts and is the sole beneficiary thereof. Mary Allred Jensen appears to be the
driving force behind this litigation and is the only individual who stands to benefit
therefrom. There are four Allred children.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs argue that they have established adverse possession through the
possession of a tenant. Utah law requires that in order to substantiate adverse possession,
there must be occupancy of the property for seven years. During that time, the occupant,
i.e. the adverse possessor, must pay the taxes and perform various other exercises
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demonstrating open, hostile and notorious occupancy of the land.
In this instance, according to Pender v. Jackson, 260 P.2d 542 (Utah 1953), it
requires actual occupancy, and not that of a tenant. Although some cases in the past
allowed tenants to hold for their landlords, it was always a situation where a tenant was
put upon the property at the onset of the adverse possession period, and not that of a
preexisting tenant.
The fatal blow to Plaintiffs' argument is that Qwest, or the telephone company,
was not their tenant. The contract with the telephone company for the lease of the
property was a covenant running with the land, and survived a sale or transfer of the
property, and, was enforceable by both the tenant and the landlord. Following the
execution of the quitclaim deeds, the owner, which was the Trusts, became the landlord
and the telephone company continued to be the tenant.
Thus, you can argue about the possession of the tenant being the possession of the
landlord. But following the transfer of the property by the quitclaim deeds, the Trusts as
the new owner, became the landlord, as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs' use of the statute, UCA 78-12-14, was misleading. The purpose of the
statute was not to create rights in a putative landlord, as the Plaintiffs claimed, but was to
prevent the landlord/owner from the adverse claims of the tenant. Plaintiffs could not be
the landlord, since they extinguished their position as landlord with the signing and
execution of the quitclaim deeds. Plaintiffs could not be the tenant, either, since that
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position was held by the telephone company who was the tenant of the Trusts, the legal
owner and landlord, pursuant to law. Therefore, this statute has been misused since it
does not in any way serve to enhance the Plaintiffs' position. In fact, it actually enhances
the position of the true owner, title holder, and landlord of the property, i.e. the Trusts.
Since Plaintiffs claim to have paid all of the taxes on the property through their
"tenant", their claim for adverse possession must fail, as well. Because Plaintiffs were
not the tenant, hot the landlord, and had no interest in the property, their claim as to
paying the taxes on the property must fail. The taxes were paid by the tenant, pursuant to
a contract entered into in 1974, wherein the tenant was required to pay the taxes either
directly or to reimburse the landlord or anyone else who might pay the taxes.
Thus, just as possession of the property through a tenant is not viable, payment of
the taxes upon the property, by a tenant, which is not their tenant, but the tenant of the
Trusts, is not viable, as well.
As to tolling the statute of limitations, it becomes abundantly clear that David
Allred knew late in 1991 he had signed the quitclaim deeds, executed the trusts, and
transferred the property. As a matter of fact, David Allred knew that in 1982, and
Plaintiffs even acknowledge on page 7 of their Brief, where they state: "...It was
understandable that David and Inez had forgotten about the deeds..." The statute of
limitations is not tolled because one forgets knowledge which he previously held. In any
event, both the letters R. 2545-2548 of David Allred and the judicial decision of January
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23, 2004, identify David Alfred's knowledge as to the veracity of the quitclaim deeds, the
establishment of the Trusts, and as declarations against interest, are incorporated in Judge
Stott's decision of January 23, 2004, wherein he rendered summary judgment based on
the statute of limitations in favor of the Defendant Trusts. R. 8175, p. 108-109.
Addendum B, Plaintiffs' Addendum B.
Both judges who heard this case ruled that the Trusts own the Provo property and
have for a long time, and as such, they are entitled to the rent proceeds therefrom. Judge
Schofield ruled on the basis of the documents which had been presented to him on
October 2, 2001, without any reference to the statute of limitations, and/or any mention of
any potential fraud or wrongdoing.
In addition, Judge Stott, absent any discussion of fraud or wrongdoing, ruled that
the statute of limitations had long since run, since David Alfred had known of the
execution of the quitclaim deeds and had also threatened legal action as he was
represented by an attorney from 1991 forward. There can be no question that David
Alfred was aware of his rights to litigate and decided not to take any action.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT UTAH
LAW DOES NOT ALLOW ADVERSE POSSESSION THROUGH A
TENANT, AND IN THIS CASE, THE TENANT WAS THE TENANT
OF THE ALLRED TRUSTS AFTER THE DEEDS WERE
EXECUTED IN 1982 AND 1983.
There is no authority in the State of Utah for the concept Appellants are trying to
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persuade the Court to adopt. Appellants/Plaintiffs are urging the Court to support the
proposition that Qwest was Plaintiffs' tenant and that Plaintiffs' were Qwest's landlord in
their claim of adverse possession. The fact is, when the property was transferred to the
Allred Trusts in 1982-1983, Qwest, at that time, became the tenant of the Trusts.
Plaintiffs were no longer the landlord, and, as a matter of law, Qwest became the tenant
of the Allred Trusts. R. 2660, 2662. Addendum B.
"When title passes, lessee ceases to hold under the grantor and he becomes
a tenant of the grantee. Privity is automatically established between lessor's
grantee and the lessee." Murphrey v. Wins low, 318 S.E. 2d 849
(North Carolina 1984). See also: 327 S.E. 2d 878 (1985)
In accord, Pearce v. Gay, 139 S.E. 2d 567 (1965), Blankenau v. Landess, 626
N.W. 2d 588 (Nebraska 2001), Kirk Corp. v. First American Title Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d
785, 270 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1990). It is little wonder, then, that based on the abovementioned
law and the documents provided, the Court, in 2001, determined:
...The documents provided by Richard Allred demonstrate that the property
leased by QWEST is owned by the trusts, David and Inez Allred having
conveyed it to the trusts in 1982. Though plaintiffs assert that they have a
colorable claim to the lease rents, I don't see it. Rather, on the face of the
documents provided by the parties, the property is owned by the trusts
and the lease rents should be paid to the trusts, (Emphasis added) R. 1207
Plaintiffs, from the date of the Court ruling, October 2, 2001, had nearly three
years to discover, process, and submit further documents supporting their Complaint and
causes of action prior to the trial date of July 26, 2004. During that time, Plaintiffs
submitted no additional documents in support of their claim which would persuade the
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Court to change or alter its' ruling. Plaintiffs' Addendum A
Even as late as October 18, 2005, Judge Schofield signed an Order from the July
26, 2004 hearing which stated in Number 5: "...There has been no intervening change
in controlling authority since October 2, 2001. No new evidence on this issue has
arisen since the October 2, 2001 Ruling. " R. 8082. Plaintiffs' Addendum C.
Plaintiffs assert error on the part of the Court, but have provided no evidence and no new
evidence . Where is the evidence that would persuade a Court to rule otherwise?
II.

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS' RULINGS SINCE
PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT AND DID NOT PRODUCE
DOCUMENTS, RECORDS OR ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIMS AND MEET THEIR
BURDEN OF PROOF.
Thus, it was understandable that Judge Stott, the trier of fact, ratified and adopted

the 2001 ruling by Judge Schofield and then granted summary judgment in February 2004
in favor of the Allred Trusts, on all causes of action except adverse possession. It was
also understandable, since Plaintiffs could not establish "a colorable claim" to the rents
and/or ownership of the Provo property, that the trier of fact ruled on a motion in limine
at a hearing on January 23, 2004, that the Court would: R. 8175 p. 108, Addendum D.
"Preclude any claims that the plaintiffs were entitled to rent from the Provo
property: The Court ruled that Plaintiffs may not claim any right or
entitlement to money or rent from the Provo property. The Court sua
sponte read into the record Judge Schofield's Ruling of October 2, 2001,
wherein Judge Schofield stated in pertinent part, "...the property is owned
by the trusts and the lease rents should be paid to the trusts."
Additionally, at the hearing on July 26, 2004, Judge Stott ruled and Judge
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Schofield later signed the Order regarding that hearing:
"No. 4. That Defendants' Motion in Limine re: Plaintiffs' Alleged Adverse
Possession Through Possession of a Tenant is granted in that plaintiffs may
not present evidence at trial of possession by a tenant to establish the
requirements of adverse possession. Because it is clear that plaintiffs'
evidence relies upon such evidence to demonstrate adverse possession, this
ruling effectively grants judgment in favor of defendants as to plaintiffs'
cause of action for adverse possession and this issue is removed from
consideration at trial. The Court finds that plaintiffs were not personally in
possession of the Provo property at any time during the claimed adverse
possession...Likewise, no adverse possession claim existed wherein the
plaintiffs deeded valid title ownership of the Provo property to the
Allred trustees in 1982 and 1983."
R. 8082-8083. Addendum L. and Plaintiffs'Addendum C.
Thus, all causes of action contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint had been dismissed.
III.

PLAINTIFFS CANNOT ESTABLISH ADVERSE POSSESSION
CONSISTENT WITH UTAH STATUTES AND UTAH CASE LAW
The enabling statute in Utah pertaining to a claim of Adverse Possession not

under a written instrument or judgment, is Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-7 stating:
78-12-7. Adverse possession - Possession presumed in owner.
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession
thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be
presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by
law; and the occupation of the property by any other person shall be
deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title,
unless it appears that the property has been held and possessed
adversely to such legal title for seven years before the commencement
of the action.
In regard to the presumption of ownership by the legal title holder, the case of
Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981) states as follows:
The statutory presumption created by this section, that the legal title holder
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is presumed to be in possession, does not satisfy Sec. 78-12-5.1 and 78-125.2 requirement of actual occupancy or possession for purposes of tolling
the running of the special statute of limitations for tax titles.
It is interesting that this case should mention "actual occupancy" when it talks
about possession, even though it relates to a different type of claim, i.e. a claim based on
a tax title. Although this presumption does not apply to those claiming by tax titles, it
would apply to the case at bar, where a tax title or other claim of right or writing is not
present. Indeed, Plaintiffs have a difficult burden with the two quitclaim deeds executed
by Plaintiffs in favor of the Allred Trusts, R. 2660, 2662 and the case of Baker v. Pattee,
684 P.2d 632 Utah Supreme Court (1984) which specifically affirms:
"Party attacking validity of written instrument such as a deed must do
so by clear and convincing evidence,"
Plaintiffs have presented no clear and convincing evidence, or evidence of any
sort, which would disprove the validity of the written instruments, i.e. the quitclaim
deeds. The burden of proof is upon the Plaintiffs to demonstrate that the quitclaim deeds
executed in 1982-1983 were not valid. Plaintiffs have not, at any time, met that burden.
Further, in Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment dated December 11,
2003, Plaintiffs admitted or stipulated that the deeds were effective to transfer ownership
of the Provo property to the Trusts, wherein they stated:
"For purposes of this motion only, it is accepted that the 1982-1983
quitclaim deeds are construed to be effective to convey title to the
Allred Trusts."
R. 4330. Addendum E.
Thus, any claim of invalidity of the Trusts' ownership in the Provo property has, by their
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own words and actions, been fully extinguished. It has been further stated in Scott v.
Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 303, 422 P.2d 525 (1966):
"In action for possession of land, statute of limitations does not begin to
run until true owner's right of possession has been so invaded as to give rise
to cause of action so that when true owner's right to possession of land had
not been so disturbed or encroached upon, statute did not begin to run."
Thus, adverse possession is initiated when an individual occupies the land of
another for seven years, possessing the land in an open, hostile and notorious manner so
as to give notice to the legal owner, pays all the taxes assessed on the property, and makes
various improvements thereon.
Plaintiffs have cited several cases, Park West Village, Inc. v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137
(Utah 1986) and Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P.2d 239 (1946) and Adams v.
Lamicq, 118 Utah 209, 221 P.2d 1037 (1950) wherein they assert that the parties in
question initiated adverse possession procedure by placing tenants in possession and did
not recognize any right of redemption in the original owners. As to the Park West
Village case, the Court did not uphold possession based on the possession by the tenant,
but by the twenty year possession by the claimant prior to the initiation of the action. The
fact that claimant had a tenant was of absolutely no persuasive value in the Court's
determination.
The above mentioned cases and their holdings can be differentiated and
distinguished from this case on two grounds: (1) the properties were claimed adversely
under color of title, i.e. the claiming parties had purchased an interest in the property by
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virtue of purchasing a tax or assessor's deed, and, (2) the tenant was placed on the
property by the adverse claimant after or at the time of initiating the adverse possession
claimed seven year period. And, it should here be noted that all the cases cited by
Plaintiffs above apparently were superceded by Pender v. Jackson, 123 Utah 501, 260
P.2d 542 (1953) which held:
"...holding of property by real estate dealer for purposes of speculation, was
not a holding for the ordinary use of the occupant and could not suffice as
basis of claim of adverse possession."
The Court, in adopting a rule from California in the case of Madson v. Cohn, 122
Cal.App. 704, 10 P.2d 531, 532, states:
"Hence, an open and notorious occupation with hostile intent is a necessary
constituent of an adverse possession. Neither a hostile intent without such
occupation, nor such occupation without hostile intent is sufficient."
Quoting, once again, another California case, Weyse v. Biedebach, 86 Cal.App.
736, 261 P. 1092, 1095, the Court states:
"But to sustain a title by adverse possession it is incumbent upon the
claimant to show actual, continued occupation and possession..., in addition
to the payment of state, county, and municipal taxes levied and assessed
upon the property...By reason of the foregoing rules, we affirm the trial
court's finding that plaintiff was not in possession of the property as
required by the adverse possession statute..."
In the case at bar, the tenant, the telephone company, was already in place, and had
been for eight years prior to the transfer of the property. And, as a matter of law and by
contractual obligation under the lease, the rights and other legal obligations of the parties
were covenants running with the land, and therefore, when the property was transferred to
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the new owners, i.e. the Allred Trusts, the tenant became the tenant of the Trusts,
pursuant to law and pursuant to the contract under which the property was leased.
Therefore, the tenant who was in possession of the land was, from that time on, the tenant
of the legal owner of the property, and not the tenant of the claimed adverse possessor
who was the Plaintiff in this matter.
This has been confirmed in numerous jurisdictions as follows:
"When title passes, lessee ceases to hold under the grantor and he becomes
a tenant of the grantee. Privity is automatically established between lessor's
grantee and the lessee." Murphrey v. Winslow, 318 S.E. 2d 849 (N.C. 1984)
"...Further, when a lessor sells property that is subject to an unfulfilled
lease, the buyer takes the property subject to the terms of the lease."
Watson v. Calvin, 9 S.W. 3d 571 (Ark. 2002)
"The Court also said as a preliminary matter, a conveyance of land, which is
subject to a valid and continuing lease, passes to the purchaser the right to
collect rent thereafter accruing...When title passes, lessee ceases to hold
under the grantor. He then becomes a tenant of the grantee, and his
possession is grantee's possession." Pearce v. Gay, 139 S.E. 2d 567 (1965)
"...Purchaser of land became landlord upon the transfer of the property to
him...A sale by the lessor of real estate, during the unexpired leasehold term
under which the tenant is holding does not, of itself, abrogate the lease,
determine the leasehold estate, or authorize the landlord or the tenant to
treat the lease as to an end." Edmund H. Blankenau v. Landess, 626 N.W.
2d 588 (Nebraska 2001)
"...Its' effect is to grant all the rights of the original landlord to the grantee
of the reversion. Id. The grantee then becomes the landlord by operation of
law, and the tenant becomes the tenant of the grantee of the reversion. Id."
Kirk Corp. V. First American Title Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 785, 270 Cal.
Rptr.24(1990)
At the time of the transfer of the Provo property from the grantor, David Allred, to
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the grantee, the Trusts, there was obviously a specific and explicit understanding that
transfer of the property was also transfer of the rights and obligations under the 1974
lease with the telephone company, since Article XIV of the telephone company lease
agreement called for it, wherein it stated:

R. 2010. Addendum F.

ARTICLE XIV Successors and Assigns
The terms, conditions and provisions of this lease shall inure to the
benefit of and be binding upon the respective parties hereto, the
personal representatives, executor and administrators of the Owner,
and the successors and assigns of both Owner and Tenant
In furtherance of grantors' plan to divest themselves of the property through the
creation of the Allred Trusts, they incorporated the terms and conditions of Section
Fourteen in the Allred Trust documents, which stated:

R. 5367, Addendum B.

SECTION FOURTEEN
Revocation and Amendment
This trust shall be irrevocable and shall not be altered, amended,
revoked or terminated by trustor or any other person. Trustor hereby
declares that his purpose in establishing the trust is to provide for the
housing, material comforts of the beneficiaries during their lives and by
this agreement trustor relinquishes absolutely and forever all his
possession or enjoyment of, or right to the income from, the Trust
Estate, and all his right and power whether alone or in conjunction
with others to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the
Trust Estate or the income therefrom. Trustor hereby renounces for
himself and his estate any interest, either vested or contingent including
any reversionary right or possibility or reverting the principal and
income of the trust.
It thus becomes patently obvious that Plaintiffs' intention, pursuant to the terms of
the trust agreement created by Plaintiffs, was to divest themselves of all right and title to
the Provo property, and all right and claim to any income which might be generated from
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the rents of the Provo property. Had this not been their intention, Plaintiffs certainly
would not have included Section Fourteen in the trust documents they executed
December 1982.
. IV. PLAINTIFFS' USE OF AND RELIANCE UPON SECTION 78-12-14
UCA ANNOTATED (1953) IS ERRONEOUS AND IS A MISUSE
AND MISCONSTRUING OF THE STATUTE.
Section 78-12-14 Possession of tenant deemed possession of landlord:
When the relation of landlord and tenant has existed between any
persons, the possession of the tenant is deemed the possession of the
landlord until the expiration of seven years from the termination of the
tenancy, or, where there has been no written lease, until the expiration
of seven years from the time of the last payment of rent,
notwithstanding that such tenant may have acquired another title, or
may have claimed to hold adversely to his landlord; but such
presumption cannot be made after the periods herein limited.
This statute does not grant authority in the State of Utah for the proposition
Plaintiffs are trying to advocate. Plaintiffs are claiming that under UCA Section 78-1214, they, Plaintiffs, are deemed to be in possession of the property as against the world.
That is not the intent of this statute. The tenant possesses the property by virtue of its'
lease. Plaintiffs claim to be the landlord, but by law relinquished any claim to that status
in 1982 when they executed the quitclaim deeds, the Trust agreements, and the 1974 lease
with the telephone company. Plaintiffs' claim against the title holder has to be
determined by applicable law, and as a matter of law, Plaintiffs no longer have any claim
as to the property, the rents, or possession, and after 1982, cannot claim to be landlords.
Section 78-12-14 is simply to protect the rights of a landlord as against a tenant
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when the tenant is occupying the premises either by a contract or by a month to month
tenancy or a tenancy by sufferance. This statute prevents the tenant from claiming
adverse possession against the landlord and prevents a tenant who is renting to believe he
is somehow acquiring some type of adverse ownership interest. The purpose is to protect
the landlord and not to enable and empower the tenant, or a third party, such as Plaintiffs.
It is obvious this is a specific situation and the statute covers only a situation
existing between a landlord and a tenant. It is also very clear that in this case, Plaintiffs
have tried to position themselves as landlords and claim the rights which might be held by
the tenants as accruing to the landlord, however, Plaintiffs are not the tenant either.
Likewise, they abdicated their position as landlord and owner when they executed the
quitclaim deeds in 1982 and 1983.
This seems to be an easily understood statute and goes hand in hand with other
cases which equate the landlord with the owner of the property. One would think that if
the statute were to be interpreted as the Plaintiffs advocate, there would be various cases
in the State of Utah agreeing with their position, but there are none.
However, the State of New York, which has a statute similar to UCA Section 7812-14, clarifies the meaning of the statute in the case of Bradt v. Giovannone 35 A.D 2d
322 315 NYS 2d 961 (1970), as follows:
"Generally, possession of tenant is not deemed adverse to his landlord so as
to enable tenant to acquire title as against landlord by adverse possession,
but such rule only circumscribes tenant's power in relation to his landlord
and not against the whole world."
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Obviously, the intent of the statute as indicated by this case, is to clarify a tenant's
position as against that of the landlord, and the landlord only, and does not stretch so far
as to encompass the whole world. Tenant, Qwest, has made no claims against the legal
owner, and in fact, as a tenant, has ratified the position of the Allred Trusts as the owner
of the property and as their landlord.
A.

The Allred Trusts Are The Owners And The Landlords

Regardless of how Plaintiffs attempt to construe Section 78-12-14, one fact
remains: As a matter of law, the Trusts are the legal owners of the Provo property. This is
shown by the 1982-1983 quitclaim deeds, by the terms of the 1974 telephone company
lease, and by the terms of the 1982 Trusts. All of these documents declare and support
the Court's finding that the Trusts are the landlords and the legal owners of the Provo
property.
According to the case of Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d
467(Utah 1989) cited in Interstate Land Corporation v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101 (Utah
APP 1990), the Court states:
"A party holding legal title to the property is presumed to be "in
possession" of it."
Presumptions require "clear and convincing " evidence to rebut the presumption.
No proof has been forthcoming. Absent a binding written document, no one other than
the legal owner can claim possession of the Provo property.
The 1999 Hawaii case of Pioneer Mill Co., Ltd. v. Dow, 978 P.2d 727 stated:
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"If the adverse claimant's occupation of the land was permissive in its
inception the presumption was that it continued to be of the same nature and
the burden was upon the adverse claimant to prove that by words or acts
sufficient to give notice to the contrary to an ordinarily prudent and vigilant
owner he the defendant, had changed its character and was thereafter
occupying adversely. Possession once shown to have been at its inception
permissive or in subordination to the true owner's title, is presumed, in the
absence of any showing to the contrary, to continue of the same character,
and the burden is on the possessor to show that it thereafter became
hostile."
The 1999 Utah case of Edgell v. Canning, 976 P.2d 1193 agrees with the Hawaii
case when it states:
"Where use of another's land begins as permissive, the party asserting that
it afterward became adverse has the burden to show when the use changed
from permissive to adverse."
And in 2000, another Utah case followed, Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline
Corp., 5 P.3d 1206, stating:
"The presumption is against the acquisition of a right by adverse use,
and the burden of proof is upon the party asserting the right."
Plaintiffs have not, and are not, able to either establish or prove their assertion of
adverse possession. They allege their possession continued following the execution and
recording of the quitclaim deeds in 1982-1983, yet fail to mention that any actions which
they took during this time were with the express permission of the Trusts. No evidence
has been presented showing that in any way, prior to 1991, Plaintiffs took any action or
communicated in any way with the Trusts in an open, hostile and notorious way.
Subsequent to 1991, Plaintiffs made numerous requests and produced numerous
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letters, R. 2463-2474, 2545-2548, none of which indicated that Plaintiffs were claiming
the Provo property adversely, in an open, hostile or notorious way. To the contrary,
Plaintiffs continually manifested, both explicitly and impliedly, the validity of the Trusts'
legal ownership of the property, by continuously requesting the trustee of the Trusts to
reconvey the Provo property to them. Such requests were in explicit recognition that the
Trusts held the legal title and ownership to the Provo property. Needless to say, never
did Plaintiffs, at any time, make the assertion that Qwest was their tenant or that they
were asserting adverse possession through the tenancy of Qwest
B.

The Familial Relationship Between The Plaintiffs And The Trustee Was
Never Strained By Claims Of Adverse Possession-There Were None

Additionally, during this time, Plaintiffs continued their familial relationship with
their son, the trustee, and other beneficiaries of the Allred Trusts. Such familial
relationship was never strained by claims of adverse possession by Plaintiffs because
there were no claims of adverse possession made by Plaintiffs. It has long been
recognized that:
"Where the relationship of father and son exists between the parties in
possession of land, the possession of the land of the one by the other is
presumed to be permissive and not adverse; and to make such possession
adverse there must be some open assertion of hostile title, other than mere
possession notice of which assertion must be brought home to the owner of
the land..."
"Where a father conveyed real estate to his son without consideration, and
thereafter remained in possession, the legal presumption is that the
possession of the father was in accordance with the deed..."
Collins et at v. Colleran et ai, 90 N.W. 364 Supreme Ct. Minn. (1902)
22

The Supreme Court of Idaho, in 1984, recognized the same principle in the case of
Berg v. Fairman, 690 P.2d 896 (1984) when it held:
"When one occupies land of a blood relative, such occupation is
presumptively with permission of true owner..."
In the case of Sheppick v. Sheppick et aL, 138 P. 1169 Utah (1914), the Court held:
"In an action to quiet title, where plaintiff established his legal title to land
in the possession of defendant, his father, evidence held insufficient to
show defendant's possession was adverse...there is nothing in this case
upon which a claim of adverse possession can successfully be based."
C.

Plaintiffs' Claim To Have Collected The Rent Is Manifestly Untrue

Plaintiffs, in conjunction with UCA 78-12-14, attempt to persuade the Court that
they have collected the rents from the Provo property. This is not true, in fact, it is
manifestly untrue. Plaintiffs attempt to suggest that they are the landlord, even though
they divested themselves of the Provo Property, by their own admission, in 1982. In
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment submitted
December 11, 2003, they state:

R. 4330. Addendum E.

"For purposes of this motion only, it is accepted that the 1982-1983
quitclaim deeds are construed to be effective to convey title to the
Allred Trusts."
Ownership of the Provo property by the Allred Trusts is also a fact which has been
established by the Court on at least two occasions by two separate rulings by two separate
judges, and which Plaintiffs have admitted, as of late, in order to further their adverse
possession claim. R. 1199-1208, 5904-5910, 8081-8085, Plaintiffs' Addendum A, B, C.
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As a matter of established fact, the Provo property rents were paid and distributed
pursuant to the terms of a document claimed to have been written by David Allred,
entitled, "Memorandum To Our Executrix, Mary Allred Jensen", delineated Bates 0771.
R. 2658. Addendum H. This document states that $300.00 each month was deposited to
an account at Zions Bank for Stephen Allred as signatory along with his parents, and
$296.69 was deposited to an account at Tracy Collins Bank for Richard G. Allred,
Trustee and signatory on the account, along with his parents. David Allred stated:
"This account will continue to receive the $300 monthly payment as
long as the Telephone Company extends its contract...The Telephone
Company has been instructed to divide the returns of the contract and
any additional option exercised to each of the above accounts...At our
death, the account becomes Richard's." (Emphasis Added)
And, although Plaintiffs assert that they directed, administered, claimed the rent
and so forth, the facts, pursuant to their own document, demonstrate that the actual
situation was considerably different than that asserted by Plaintiffs. R. 2658 Addendum
H. And their assertions are definitively proven to the contrary when you examine
Stephen Allred's continued use and withdrawal of the funds from the specifically
designated Zions Bank Account for a period in excess often years.
D.

Telephone Company Lease Article XIV, By Contract And As A
Matter of Law, Transferred Qwests' Tenancy to New Owner

Additionally, Article XIV of the 1974 telephone company lease, as a matter of law
and as a matter of contract, triggered the transfer of the tenant, Qwest, to the new owner,
the Allred Trusts, on December 30, 1982 when the Trusts were executed. R. 2010 Add. F.
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Likewise, Section Fourteen, Revocation and Amendment, of the Allred Trust
documents created in 1982 by David Allred, state that "...by this agreement trustor
relinquishes absolutely and forever all his possession or enjoyment of, or right to the
income from, the Trust Estate..." (Emphasis Added)

R. 5367 Addendum B.

In reality, then, Plaintiffs not only cannot claim any authority over the principal of
the Trust, but by the very nature of their contractual agreement under the terms of the
Trusts, cannot claim any of the rent or income from the Trust Estate. R.5367 Add. B.
It should be kept in mind that this preclusion as to the claims of ownership or
rights to receive the rents, did not come from an external source, but was imposed by
David Allred, by virtue of his creating the Allred Trusts in 1982.
Lest Plaintiffs should claim some abnormality in the creation of the Trusts, please
take judicial notice that Plaintiff David Allred created and executed identical trust
documents four years earlier in 1978 for the benefit of his daughter and her family in
conveying an eleven acre parcel of land to them. R 2677-2687, 2689-2690. Addendum C.
V.

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS DAVID AND
INEZ ALLRED ON THEIR ADVERSE POSSESSION CLAIMDefendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on July 25, 2002 in regard to all

of Plaintiffs' causes of action. A hearing on this motion came up in December 2002,
wherein the Plaintiffs asked for additional time. Thus, the Summary Judgment Motion by
Defendants was amended and submitted again to the Court, and came up for hearing on
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April 3, 2003. The Court ruled on this motion that there were disputed facts which
precluded the summary judgment ruling and thus, a third motion for summary judgment
was filed by Defendants and the Plaintiffs filed a counter motion for summary judgment
in regard to their adverse possession claim, which hearing was held on January 23, 2004
and a memorandum ruling was made on February 6, 2004. R.5904-5910 PL Addendum B
In this memorandum ruling, Judge Stott, the trier of fact, ruled that the First,
Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations.
The Court continued to discuss the two motions for summary judgment in regard to
adverse possession and ruled that there were genuine issues of material fact and questions
of law which precluded the Court from granting either motion. The Court cited there
were disputes as to who paid the taxes on the property, whether the parties, i.e. the
Plaintiffs were in actual possession, open and notorious to a claim of ownership and
whether the Plaintiffs were in exclusive possession of the property during the time in
question, as well as other issues. Thus, neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendants received
a favorable ruling in regard to their motions regarding adverse possession at this hearing.
A.

Lower Court Did Not Err In Ruling Plaintiffs Were Not Occupiers
And Could Not Claim Rent Or Income From The Provo Property

The trier of fact did rule in regard to Plaintiffs' adverse possession claims on July
26, 2004, the date set for trial of this matter. The Court had previously ruled on a motion
in limine, that Plaintiffs could not claim the rent or income from the Provo property and
had upheld the law of the case, wherein it was declared that the Trusts were the owner of
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the Provo property, and had been for a long time and were entitled to the rents and
proceeds therefrom. R. 8081-8085. Plaintiffs' Addendum C.
Thus, as can be seen from the foregoing arguments in this brief, Plaintiffs, as of
the time of the execution of the quitclaim deeds in 1982 and 1983, were not the owners of
the Provo property, were not the landlords of the Provo property, and were not the
occupiers of the Provo property, and could not claim to be occupying the Provo property.
Since the telephone company paid or reimbursed the property taxes and since
Plaintiffs were not the landlords subsequent to the execution of the quitclaim deeds in
1982 and 1983, and since Plaintiffs were not occupying the premises in an open,
notorious and hostile manner, they could not present at trial any evidence claiming to
have done such. R. 8082-8083. Plaintiffs' Addendum C. Thus, the motion in limine and
its ruling, effectively eclipsed any claim Plaintiffs might have to the Provo property, and
ended the Plaintiffs' case before it began, as was proper, since they had no documents or
other evidence with which to prove their case.
Thus, based on the fact that Plaintiffs had no documentary evidence, could not
meet their burden of proof, could not claim any interest in the Provo property by virtue of
the parol evidence rule, the statute of frauds, and the documents which they had signed,
the Court ruled properly and did not err.
VI.

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE
UTAH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN ON PLAINTIFFS'
FRAUD AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS, AND
THAT THE STATUTE WAS NOT TOLLED.
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Section 78-12-26 UCA provides a three year statute of limitations "for relief on the
ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action in such case does not accrue
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake."
Section 78-12-25 UCA provides "an action may be brought within four years for
relief not otherwise provided for by law." This section was cited in Kamas SEC Co, v.
Taylor, 226 P.2d 111 (1950) which states: "Action clearly involved a breach of fiduciary
duty, a four year limitation on action for relief not otherwise provided for was applicable.
The elements of fraud have been described as follows: (1) That representation was
made; (2) Concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) Which was false; (4) Which
the representor either knew to be false or made recklessly knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representations; (5) For the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) That the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity; (7) Did, in fact, rely upon it; (8) And was thereby induced to act;
(9) To his injury and damage. Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
2001Ut.25P.3dl98.
Plaintiffs, in quoting a letter from David Allred, R. 4342 claim that in [June 1976]
they were told they were paying too much income tax. Thus, 1976 appears to be the date
Plaintiffs assert representations were made regarding their income tax. Although their
statements are not true, they are nevertheless far too remote in time to comply with the
current elements of fraud, since the time between the alleged representation and the
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alleged action was six to eight years and would not qualify as....[2] "Concerning a
presently existing material fact." See Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ o/LDS, Id..
It would appear that fraud and breach of fiduciary duty are somewhat intertwined,
as causes of action, and therefore, this Court has found that:
"Finding of fraud must be based on existence of all essential elements..."
Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102 (Utah 1984).
"Burden is upon party charging fraud to prove fraud by clear and
convincing evidence." Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873 (Utah 1978)
"Fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or, stated another
way, by clear preponderance of evidence." Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v.
Sohrn, 391 P.2d 293 (Utah 1964)
"We believe that the rule in Bradbury (401 P.2d at 713) reflects the current
State of Utah law, i.e. the relationship of parent and child does not, in and
of itself, establish a confidential relationship giving rise to a presumption of
unfair dealing as in Jones. " Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345 quoting Bradbury
v. Rasmussen} 401 P.2d 710 ( Utah 1965)
Plaintiffs claim equitable estoppel and the "special circumstances exception" bar
the statute of limitations defense. They have continued to assert they are entitled to an
endless extension or tolling of the statute of limitations.
But the fact is, David and Inez Allred knew, and lately have admitted, that in
December 1982, David Allred as trustor, created nine separate irrevocable trusts. A
quitclaim deed was executed in 1982 which conveyed 50% interest in the Provo property
from Plaintiffs to the Allred Trusts. R. 2662 In 1983, an additional quitclaim deed was
prepared and recorded conveying the remaining 50% interest in the Provo property to the
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Allred Trusts. David and Inez Allred admitted in their Complaint they signed these
transfer documents. R. 5905. In 1991, David Allred claimed "he discovered for the first
time" about the Provo property conveyance to the Trusts. R. 0001-0028, p. 7. In January
1992, he conferred with his attorney and by his own admissions in his letter of May 20,
1992, he recited the various actions he had taken. R. 5904-5910. Plaintiffs' Addendum B
The Court found that David Allred was fully cognizant of the circumstances, had
advice and counsel from his attorney, threatened legal action, and allowed the statute to
run having full knowledge of the quitclaim deeds, the Trusts, and their effect. R. 59045910. Plaintiffs' Addendum B. R. 2662, 2660, 5367-5370, 2677-2690. Addendum B, C.
Of course David Allred had full knowledge of the effect of the deeds and trusts.
He had just effectuated an identical transaction four years earlier in 1978, where he used
documents identical in every way, to convey a parcel of land to his daughter and her
- family in the exact same manner. R. 2677-2687, 2689-2690, Addendum C.

Thus, for

Plaintiffs to now claim that they are entitled to equitable estoppel and "special
circumstances exemption" is not credible and is without merit.
Plaintiffs have not in this action previously pled equitable estoppel or claimed the
"special circumstances exemption". It is believed that the rules of appellate procedure
preclude the introduction of new claims, or the introduction of new evidence not
previously pled or introduced at the trial court level. Plaintiffs may not now address new
arguments or plead new matters at the appellate level.
A.

Plaintiffs Make Allegations Of Fraud Yet Provide No
Documents or Testimony to Prove Their Claim

Plaintiffs have made numerous and repetitious allegations regarding alleged fraud
in this case. However, they have produced no evidence of fraud and cannot produce
evidence because there was no fraud. Even Inez Allred, their principle witness, has not
been able to substantiate their claims. An actual look her testimony shows it to be
diametrically opposed to Plaintiffs' groundless allegations.
Statement

Source

Regarding "Repeated overtures and assertions"
Inez declared, "I don't know what you talked
about sometimes in our library."

Inez H. Allred, Deposition II
July 1, 2002, Page 144, R. 2633*
Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 5 No. 19

Regarding alleged tax savings by signing deeds,
Inez replied "He never discussed it with me."
Regarding presentation of quitclaim deeds for
signing, Inez replied, "My husband presented it."

Inez H. Allred, Deposition I
July 5, 2001, Page 45, R. 2399*
R. 2418, 2399
Inez H. Allred, Deposition I
July 5, 2001, Page 41, R. 0559*

Richard Allred was not present when the
quitclaim deeds were signed. Inez stated,
"You weren't there when I signed it."
Thus, no "force and coerce"

Inez H. Allred, Deposition II
July 1, 2002, Page 105, 107, 223,
Page 224, R. 2595, 2597, 2598*
Complaint p. 11, No. 37(e).

Regarding the reconveyance of Provo property,
"Richard always said "No".

Inez H. Allred, Deposition II
July 1, 2002, Page 216-217, 219
R. 2619, 2620*

Regarding legal ownership of Provo property,
Inez said, "We thought we did because you
"aIIowed"us to take care of it for ten years."

Inez H. Allred, Deposition II
July 1, 2002, Page 175, R. 2623*

Richard Allred provided no attorney services for
Provo property, "I can't remember of any
services he provided for the Provo property.
My husband, David, did those things."

Inez H. Allred, Deposition I
July 5, 2001, Page 36, R. 0566
*See Addendum O for R.
and Deposition Pages
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Thus, this brief comparison of allegations made by Plaintiffs as compared to the
actual testimony of Inez Allred, demonstrates conclusively, that Plaintiffs' accusations
are without merit. Even when Plaintiff Inez Allred was asked the simple question:
"Did you sign the quitclaim deeds?" she was unreliable and contradictory in her
responses:

Addendum P.

Affidavit:
"I did not sign the December 1982 deed on December 30, 1982."
Affidavit:
"I did not sign the December 1982 deed on December 30, 1982."
Admissions: "Inez H. Allred...does not believe that she signed Exhibit No. 30."
Errata

"...Inez H. Allred and David H. Allred signed the two Quit Claim Deeds."
Additionally, when Inez was questioned about signing the Allred Trusts, she

claimed she did not sign them and had never seen them until June 2001. R. 8171 p.52
Addendum P Yet it is obvious that it was her signature on the quitclaim deeds and the
trust documents which were signed nine times before a notary on December 30, 1982.
After repeated denials, the Plaintiffs now state in their appellate brief, page 7, "It was
understandable that David and Inez had forgotten about the deeds.-." Thus, these
representations, under oath, by Inez Allred, demonstrate definitively that in spite of
Plaintiffs' many, many allegations and the barrage of rhetoric, Plaintiffs' case has no
merit. Plaintiffs have no evidence and did not and can not meet their burden of proof.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion one must reach is that although Plaintiffs have fabricated a good
story, they have produced absolutely no evidence, documents, admissible testimony or
proof of any nature which might substantiate their claims. This became clear early on
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when Judge Schofield ruled in 2001 that the Trusts owned the Provo property and had for
many years. Judge Stott, as trier of fact, and upon hearing further testimony from both
sides, reaffirmed that "...David H. Allred as trustor had created nine separate irrevocable
trusts..." and that the Provo property have been lawfully quit claimed to them many years
before. The Trusts owned the property and were entitled to the rents. And, any claim of
open, notorious, and hostile possession adversely held by David and Inez Allred is simply
not supported by the facts of the case. R. 8175, p. 108-109, Addendum D. R. 5909,
Plaintiffs' Addendum B.
It has, thus, been concluded by two separate lower court judges that based upon the
documents presented, David and Inez Allred conveyed the Provo property in 1982 and
1983 to the Allred Trusts and that such conveyances were lawful and binding and were
recognized by the Court as conveying away all ownership and rights they had thereto.
These findings, carefully formulated and based upon numerous rulings and a
thorough analysis of the evidence presented, were the Findings of Fact by the Fourth
Judicial District Court and should be affirmed.
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CROSS APPEAL OF
OVERRULING OF FINAL JUDGMENT
IN A CIVIL CASE

CROSS APPEAL STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is a cross appeal of a final judgment in a civil case. The original
judgment was entered in Fourth District Court on September 22, 2004 by the Honorable
Gary D. Stott and was subsequently overruled in Fourth District Court on July 28, 2005 by
the Honorable Anthony W. Schofield. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Section 78-2-2(3)(j) and Section 78-2a3(3).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower Court err in allowing Plaintiffs' untimely motion of January

20, 2005 to be heard? This issue was preserved at R. 7673-7692, R. 7399- 7411. This
ruling should be reviewed under the "summary judgment statute, since it involves only legal
conclusions, which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court."
Martin v. Kearl, 917 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
2.

Did the lower Court err in referring back to and overruling the September

22, 2004 hearing and order when the motion did not mention this hearing? This issue was
preserved at R. 7399-7411. The applicable rule of this matter is URCP Rule 12(h). The
standard of review is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Stokes v. Van Wagner, 987
P.2d 602 (Utah 1999).
3.

Did the lower Court err in finding that the trustee waived the right to the

rents, in light of Section Fourteen of the trust agreement, wherein Plaintiffs repudiated any
possible claim or right to the rents? The issue was preserved at R. 7399-7411. This is
reviewable under summary judgment standard, since it involves only legal conclusions,
"which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court." Martin v.

Kearl, 917 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah Ct Appl 1996).
4.

Did the lower Court err in failing to take judicial notice of the ruling in a

motion in limine precluding any claims that the Plaintiffs were entitled to rent from the
Provo property? This issue was preserved at R. 7399-7411. This ruling was a question of
law, reviewable under the summary judgment standard which involves only legal
conclusions, "which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court."
Martin v. Kearl 917 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
5.

Did the lower Court err in granting relief above and beyond the relief

prayed for? This issue was preserved at R. 7399-7411. The applicable rule of this matter is
URCP 12(h). The standard of review is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
Stokes v. Van Wagner, 987 P.2d 602 (Utah 1999).
6.

Did the lower Court err in overruling a final judgment entered by a judge of

concurrent authority and jurisdiction? This issue was preserved at R. 7399-7411. This is a
question of law, reviewable for correctness. Stokes v. Van Wagner, 987 P.2d 602 (Utah 1999).
This is supported by the case of Nelson v. Salt Lake City School Board, 645 P.2d 658.
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
For Full Text of Statutes and Rules Refer to Addendum A
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 7(f)(2) Orders.
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 7(f)(1) Orders.
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 12(h) Waiver of defenses.
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 59(a) Grounds.
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 59(b) Time for motion.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This cross appeal is from a judgment rendered by the Honorable Anthony W.
Schofield in Fourth District Court setting aside the final judgment which was entered on
September 22, 2004 by the Honorable Gary D. Stott in Fourth District Court.
This case, and more particularly this counter-claim, had been tried and adjudicated by
Judge Stott. A hearing was held in Fourth District Court, on September 22, 2004. The
Court found for the Defendants that the rent proceeds during the limited statutory period of
March 1998 to August 2001 were in the amount of $127,800.00. The Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law together with an Order in regard to the September 22, 2004 hearing
stated:
"Judgment in favor of the Allred Trusts as against Plaintiffs should be
entered in the amount of $127,800.00...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED..."
The Court ordered Mr. Carlston, attorney for Plaintiffs, to prepare the order
appropriately for the ruling. Mr. Carlston agreed. Mr. Carlston then asked the Court for
permission to prepare an order for the July 26, 2004 hearing, as well. R. 8166, 6941, Add. G.
Plaintiffs' counsel prepared the final order and judgment for each hearing and
submitted them to Defendants on November 19, 2004. However, Plaintiffs never filed the
orders with the Court. This is contrary to URCP Rule 7(f)(2) and 7(f)(1). Addendum A.
R. 7724-7730. R. 7724-7730. Addendum I.
In the interim, Judge Stott was rotated off this case and Judge Anthony W. Schofield
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took his place. Plaintiffs then filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Memorandum Decision or
for New Trial on January 28, 2005. Plaintiffs requested that the word stipulate be excised
from the January 11, 2005 Memorandum Decision. R. 7356-7362, 7194-7198. Addendum J.
The Court eventually granted Plaintiffs' motion, and in addition, set aside Judge
Stott's judgment of September 22, 2004 on the basis that it had not become final. The
proposed order and judgment was never filed by Plaintiffs' counsel as required by URCP
7(f)(2). Addendum A.

R. 6941 -6943.

The Court set aside the September 22, 2004 ruling, entered a new ruling after a short
evidentiary hearing, and therefore deprived Defendants of their previous judgment in the
amount of $127,800.00. R.7600-7602. Addendum G. Addendum K.
The issues here are that the Court incorrectly allowed Plaintiffs relief in regard to the
September 22, 2004 hearing, particularly in light of their failure to follow the rules in
preparing and filing the order and judgment as ordered by the Court to do, and set aside the
previous ruling and judgment without any statutory basis, and without any statutory reasons
pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) and Rule 7(f)(1), Rule 59(a) and Rule 59(b) and Rule 12(h) as well
as the declarations contained in Section Fourteen of the trusts wherein "trustor relinquishes
absolutely and forever all his possession or enjoyment of, or right to the income from, the
Trust Estate..." Further, the Court ignored the order regarding Defendants' motion in limine
which precluded Plaintiffs from making any claim of entitlement to the rent proceeds from
the Provo property. R. 5367-5370. Addendum B.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
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A.

Plaintiffs' January 28, 2005 motion was untimely due to the misfeasance of

Plaintiffs' counsel in not filing an order as ordered by the Court on September 22, 2004.
B.

Plaintiffs' motion was only in regard to the December 17, 2004 and January

11, 2005 order and did not apply to the September 22, 2004 ruling, order and judgment.
C.

Due to Plaintiffs' inaction, the final judgment was not entered. Plaintiffs

should not benefit by their own malfeasance. R.6941-6943, 7724-7730. Addendum G.
D.

Plaintiffs could claim no right to the rent proceeds from the Provo property.

They repudiated the right in Section Fourteen of the trust agreement, and, the Court had
ruled they could not claim Plaintiffs were entitled to rent from the Provo property.
E.

Likewise, the law of the case as explicitly stated by the Court on October 2,

200land reaffirmed on many different occasions, stated: "...The property leased by Qwest is
owned by the trusts...on the face of the documents provided by the parties, the property is
owned by the trusts and the lease rents should be paid to the trusts."R.1207, PL Add. A
F.

Plaintiffs could not make a claim for the rents due to the ruling of the motion

in limine, and Section Fourteen of the trusts that stated they: "Relinquished absolutely and
forever all his possession or enjoyment of, or right to the income from , the Trust Estate..."
R. 8175, p 108-109. R. 5367-5370. Addendum D and B.
G.

The newly rotated judge exceeded his authority in retrying various aspects

of the case which had already been adjudicated by the trier of fact. Changes and
amendments to judgments as well as rehearings should follow the procedure for such
overruling of previous orders and judgments and should be in strict conformance with
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URCP Rule 59(a) and Rule 59(b). Some type of proof or evidence that good cause exists
must also be submitted.
ARGUMENT
L

DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS'
UNTIMELY MOTION OF JANUARY 28, 2005 TO BE HEARD.
On January 28, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Alter or Amend

Memorandum Decision or For New Trial in Fourth District Court. The Motion requested
that the Court revise or amend statements from the January 11, 2005 order which stated
Plaintiffs stipulated to owing The Allred Trusts an amount of money. R. 7356-6943 Ad J.
Citing the case of Rice v. Granite School District, 456 P.2d 159, 162-163 (Utah
l969)(q\ioting Dettamanti v. Lampoc Union School District, 143 Cal.App.2d 715,300 P.2d
78, 81 (1956)) it states:
"Where the delay in commencing action is induced by the conduct of the
defendant it cannot be availed of by him as a defense."
In this case, Plaintiffs' counsel was ordered to prepare the judgment and orders for
the September 22, 2004 hearing, and yet failed to file them, and as a result, gained the
advantage of another hearing with a newly rotated judge who may or may not have been
fully informed on many preceding matters, rulings and orders. R. 6941-6943, 7724-7730.
Without presenting any reason, Plaintiffs were allowed to profit from their own
malfeasance. The Court erred in allowing the January 28, 2005 motion to be heard without
justifiable and demonstrable reasons as are outlined in Rule 59(a) and 59(b) URCP, and
granted relief not within the scope of the motion. Addendum G and I.
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II.

DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN REFERRING BACK TO THE
SEPTEMBER 22,2004 HEARING WHEN THE MOTION DID NOT
MENTION SUCH HEARING.
On January 28, 2005, Plaintiffs' filed a Motion To Alter Or Amend Memorandum

Decision Or For New Trial. R.7356-7362, 7194-7198 Ad. J. The Memorandum Decision
issued by Judge Stott is the ruling of January 11, 2005, ruling on the issues decided at the
hearing of December 17, 2004. Since this was the prayer of Plaintiff s Motion, the Court
overstepped its' bounds by granting Plaintiffs far more relief than they prayed for.
Plaintiffs, at the new hearing, referred back to the ruling of September 22, 2004 as
part of their argument. In allowing Plaintiffs to discuss issues from the September 22, 2004
hearing when their motion made no mention of this hearing, the Court erred.
III.

DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE TRUSTEE
WAIVED THE RIGHT TO THE RENTS, IN LIGHT OF SECTION
FOURTEEN OF THE TRUSTS WHEREIN PLAINTIFFS
REPUDIATED THEIR RIGHTS TO THE RENTS,
The trust agreements executed by Plaintiffs contained specific language in Section

Fourteen, stating that Plaintiffs relinquished "absolutely and forever", all their possession or
right to the income from the Provo property. R. 5367-5370. Addendum B.
In light of the above, how, then, could the trustee waive the right to the rents back to
the Plaintiffs? The Courts' ruling of waiver appears to pertain to income tax preparation by
trustee during the years 1994 to 1997. Based upon that thinking, however, there could be no
waiver after 1997 since the trustee provided no tax preparation for Plaintiffs after 1997.
And, the very refusal of the trustee to prepare the tax returns after 1997, was an action, at the
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very least, repudiating any future waiver. Thus, the Court erred in finding that the trustee
waived the rights of the Trusts to the rent proceeds in favor of Plaintiffs.
IV.

DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN FAILING TO TAKE JUDICIAL
NOTICE OF THE RULING ON A MOTION IN LIMINE
PRECLUDING ANY CLAIMS THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE
ENTITLED TO RENT FROM THE PROVO PROPERTY.
Judge Stott, at a pre-trial hearing on January 23, 2004, granted a motion in limine

brought specifically for the purpose of limiting any testimony as to claims that Plaintiffs
were entitled to rent from the Provo property states:

R. 8175, p. 108, Addendum D.

"Seventh, preclude any claims that the plaintiffs were entitled to rent
from the Provo property..,"
Judge Stott continued on and read Judge Schofield's October 2, 2001 ruling, stating:
"...Though plaintiffs assert that they have a colorable claim to the lease
rents, I don't see it. Rather, on the face of the documents provided by the
parties, the property is owned by the trusts and the lease rents should be
paid to the trusts..."
R. 1207 Plaintiffs' Addendum A
Therefore, any claims made by Plaintiffs that they were entitled to the rents was set
to rest by these rulings of Judge Schofield and Judge Stott. Plaintiff could not even cross
the threshold to make a claim, let alone raise a defense to the counterclaim on the basis of
waiver. The Court clearly erred in its' 2005 ruling. R. 1207, 8175. Add. D, PL Add. A .
V.

DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN GRANTING RELIEF ABOVE
AND BEYOND THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR BY PLAINTIFFS.
Plaintiffs only request in their January 28, 2005 Motion To Alter Or Amend

Memorandum Decision Or For New Trial was as follows:
"Plaintiffs, therefore, request that the Court issue an order amending its
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Memorandum Decision which can be clarified to reflect that plaintiffs
have never stipulated to owing the defendant trusts any amount or,
alternatively, for a new trial on this issue..."
R. 7362-7356 Add. J.
Plaintiffs requested, "...to amend the Court's findings in its January 11,2005
Memorandum Decision or for a new trial..." R.7362-7256. Add. J. However, the Court
acted beyond the scope of Plaintiffs' request and granted a new hearing wherein Plaintiffs
were allowed to bring up issues not prayed for from the September 22, 2004 hearing.
To appeal for a rehearing on a matter, the party must follow the requirements
outlined in URCP Rule 59(a) and Rule 59(b) which are listed in Addendum.
While Plaintiffs cite "(a)(6)Insufficiency of the evidence" they do not indicate what
the insufficiency was, nor do they offer any proof. In this case, there was no new evidence
and there was no new law. Without new evidence, new facts or new law, there are no
grounds for reconsideration. Plaintiffs provided none. Thus, the Court erred in granting
Plaintiffs relief above and beyond the relief prayed for.
VI.

DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN OVERRULING A FINAL
JUDGMENT ENTERED BY A JUDGE OF CONCURRENT
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION.
The rule of law generally precludes one District Judge of concurrent jurisdiction

from acting as an Appellate Judge and reversing a ruling from another. See In re Estate of
Mecham, 537 P.2d 312 (1975), Harward v. Harward, 526 P.2d 1183, Peterson v. Peterson,
530 P.2d 821. Utah Supreme Court inNelson v. Salt Lake City School Board, 645 P.2d 658:
"This Court has ruled that one district court judge may not overrule the
ruling of another district court judge..."
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Judge Stott was the trier of fact for virtually all of this case. He was fully aware of
the circumstances and events encompassing this case. He made numerous rulings in regard
to the ownership of the property, the application of the statute of limitations, and various
motions in limine which had been filed in this matter. Indeed, Judge Stott ruled that
Plaintiffs were precluded from making any claim of right to the rent. He also stated that the
Allred Trusts were the owners of the Provo property and were thus entitled to the rent
proceeds therefrom. R.6616-6618. Addendum L. The newly rotated judge appeared to act
without full cognizance of the record in overruling Judge Stott's final order, and thus erred.
CONCLUSION
While reasonable men may differ, it does not seem reasonable to have multiple
judges entering different rulings, particularly in light of the fact that Judge Schofield was
not the judge who heard most of the motions, particularly the motions in limine, saw the
evidence during trial, and listened to the arguments of counsel. Judge Stott had formulated
rulings as to the conduct of the trial, the nature of the evidence presented, and the rulings in
regard to the motions in limine.
But most fatal of all is the fact that there had been no new facts and/or law presented
by Plaintiffs to satisfy the provisions of URCP 59(a). With no reason presented to justify a
new hearing, there was no provision which would allow Judge Schofield to overrule a judge
of concurrent jurisdiction. Due to Court error, Judge Schofield's ruling should be vacated
and Judge Stott's ruling should be reinstated, since Judge Stott, acting as trier of fact, was
clearly the most qualified to render the ruling in this particular matter.
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CROSS APPEAL OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
CONSOLIDATED CASE

CONSOLIDATED CASE STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final "Summary Judgment in a Civil Case". This case was
consolidated with the primary case in this matter due to the closely related issues and
content. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court err in granting summary judgment for the Plaintiffs and

ordering the release of the Notice of Action Pending and granting attorney fees to Plaintiffs?
This issue was preserved at R 7956-7957. "Thus, summary judgment only involves legal
conclusions, which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court."
Martin v. Kearl, 917 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
For Full Text of Statutes and Rules Refer to Addendum A
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 7(f)(1) Orders.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-40-2 Lis Pendens.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-40-2.5 Motions related to a notice
of the pendency of an action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a cross appeal from a Summary Judgment entered by the Fourth District
Court, in regard to a case originally filed in Second District Court and transferred to Utah
County. All of the parties had not appeared in this matter, when the Court rendered
summary judgment, ordering the removal of a Notice of Action Pending filed in Davis
County, and granting Plaintiffs' attorney fees in the amount of $8058.00. The issues on
appeal are in regard to the efficacy of granting attorney fees, whether or not such Notice of
Action Pending was a lis pendens, or an attempt to collect a judgment for money.

On September 22, 2004, in the underlying case of this matter, Judge Stott issued a
ruling and judgment in favor of Defendants in the amount of $127,800.00. This amount
represented the rent proceeds which Plaintiffs wrongfully appropriated from the "Provo
property" rents. R.6941-6943, 8166 p. 108-111. Addendum G.
On September 22, 2004, Plaintiffs' counsel was assigned by the Court to prepare an
order and judgment in regard to the September 22, 2004 hearing. R.6941-6943 Add. G.
On November 19, 2004, Plaintiffs' counsel prepared said judgment and order and
mailed it to Defendants. Plaintiffs did not send the proposed order to the Court. Addendum I
In late December 2004, a "FOR SALE" sign appeared on the house of the Plaintiff in
Bountiful, Utah. Defendants filed a "Notice Of Action Pending" on December 30, 2004, to
prevent Plaintiff from disposing of the property and being unable to satisfy the September
22, 2004 judgment. Rule 7(f)(2) states:
Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party
shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections
to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party
preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an
objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
The only variation from this Rule was that Plaintiffs' counsel was ordered to prepare
and file the order. Plaintiffs' counsel failed to file the order and judgment they prepared on
November 19,2004. R.6941-6943. AddendumG. Addendum I.
Nevertheless, Rule 7(f)(1) states:
An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order
entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of
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money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment..
The filing of Defendant's "Notice of Action Pending" was filed in order to collect a
debt, pursuant to Rule 7(f)(1) and required only an order to begin the collection process.
Plaintiffs filed an action in Davis County on March 30, 2005 to remove the "Lis Pendens".
Various motions to strike, including Failure to Join an Indispensable Party, i.e. Inez
Allred were filed, since Mary Allred Jensen was claiming ownership of the property on
behalf of the David H. Allred Exemption Trust and the Mary H. Allred Survivors Trust
which were the Plaintiffs in the Davis County action. Several hearings were held in Davis
County and the Court determined that the matter should be consolidated in Utah County.
Meanwhile, Fourth District Court experienced a rotation of judges and a newly
assigned judge agreed to reconsider Judge Stott's ruling of September 22, 2004. The Court
eventually concluded that the trustee of the Trusts, Richard Allred, had waived the right to
receive the rents, and therefore, the previous judgment was set aside. R.7601-7602.
Upon receipt of the new judgment, the Notice of Action Pending was rescinded. It is
believed that Plaintiffs sold the house to a third party. R. 7601-7602. Addendum K.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court ruled that the Defendant Trusts were the owners of the Provo property
and were entitled to the rent proceeds. On September 22, 2004 a judgment was rendered
giving Defendants a judgment in the amount of $127,800.00 against Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' counsel was assigned by the Court to prepare the order and judgment and
did so on November 19, 2004, sending a copy to the Defendants. Plaintiffs failed to ever
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send a copy to the Court for filing. Plaintiffs then used this to their advantage in filing a
Motion to Alter or Amend Memorandum Decision or for New Trial on January 28, 2005.
R. 6941-6943. Addendum G. Addendum I.
Defendants, having no abstract to file with the Davis County Recorder, learned that a
"For Sale" sign was placed upon Plaintiffs' home in Bountiful, Utah. Defendants filed a
Notice of Action Pending with the Davis County Recorder. R.7956-7957. Addendum M.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should not benefit from their own malfeasance, and,
summary judgment should not have been issued in regard to a lawsuit filed in Davis County,
which was transferred to Utah County and consolidated with this action. Summary judgment
was entered, various motions to strike had not been heard, all the parties had not been
joined, and some of the parties had not as yet answered the Complaint at the time the Court
issued summary judgment. Attorney fees were awarded to the Plaintiffs. It is argued by
Defendants that attorney fees were improper and that Rule 7(f)(1) allows the collection of a
money judgment without the imposition of a final judgment and order. There was during
this time, a judgment in the amount of $127,800.00 outstanding. Later, a judgment against
the Plaintiffs was entered for costs in the amount of $4065.49 in favor of the Defendants.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS WERE WELL WITHIN THEIR RIGHTS TO FILE A
NOTICE OF ACTION PENDING IN THE ABSENCE OF A FILED
JUDGMENT, PURSUANT TO URCP 7(f)(1), AND BY VIRTUE OF
THE FACT THAT IT WAS SIMPLY AN EFFORT TO COLLECT THE
DEBT.
As stated earlier, Defendants filed a Notice of Action Pending against the Bountiful,
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Utah, property of Plaintiff in an attempt to prevent Plaintiff from disposing of her assets
and voiding paying the judgment. Plaintiffs' counsel had been assigned to file the final
judgment resulting from the September 22, 2004 hearing in the underlying case. Because of
malfeasance on his part, Plaintiffs' counsel failed to file the final order and judgment in a
timely manner. Defendants thus filed a Notice of Action Pending to preserve their right to
collect the judgment rendered in Fourth District Court.
II.

THERE WAS A JUDGMENT AWARDED IN FOURTH DISTRICT
COURT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS IN THE AMOUNT OF
$127,800.00 AT THE TIME THE NOTICE OF ACTION PENDING
WAS FILED. LATER, THE COURT WOULD ALSO ENTER A
JUDGMENT FOR COSTS OF COURT FOR DEFENDANTS.
At the time Defendants filed their Notice of Action Pending in Davis County, there

was an order and judgment in their favor in Fourth District Court in the amount of
$127,800.00. Plaintiffs were aware of this judgment, since they had been ordered by the
Court to prepare the order and judgment and file it with the Court at the conclusion of the
September 22, 2004 hearing. R. 6941-6943. Addendum G.
At the time Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this matter on March 17, 2005, they
still had not complied with the order of the Court in filing the final order and judgment from
the September 22, 2004 hearing. Why had Plaintiffs delayed filing the judgment? Add. I.
Later, to add to the judgment amount of $127,800.00, the Court would also award
Defendants the sum of $4,065.49 as costs of court as the prevailing party.
III.

THE TRANSFER OF THE BOUNTIFUL HOUSE WAS A SHAM AND
A VIOLATION OF THE UTAH UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT.
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Plaintiffs claim that on June 8, 2001, Plaintiffs' Bountiful house was transferred to
the David H. and Mary H. Allred Trust. Subsequently, on January 17, 2003, Mary A.
Jensen, newly appointed trustee for the David H. and Mary H. Allred Trust, transferred an
undivided one half interest each to David H. Allred Exemption Trust and the Mary H.
Allred Survivors Trust, Mary Allred Jensen, trustee and sole beneficiary.
Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, such transfers were not known to Defendants, and
Mary Allred Jensen, at her deposition, denied taking any actions on behalf of her parents or
any of their trusts. R. 8056 p. 31. Addendum N.
Such transfers were made in violation of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,
UCA 25-6-1 through 25-6-14, which prohibits the transferring of property to avoid
creditors. The Allred Trusts were a creditor of Inez H. Allred at that time.
The transfer of the Bountiful house property was a sham, since Inez H. Allred
continued to live in the house as she had done since 1957. No action had been taken to fund
the Bountiful house trust or to have this trust make the payment of bills relative to the
property. Property tax notices were still sent to David and Inez Allred. The taxes on the
property and the utility bills were still in the name of David and Inez Allred and were
certainly not in the name of a trust, although the Complaint alleged the property was
transferred in June 2001. Even though Plaintiffs claim that the trust was executed earlier,
no action in terms of establishing or ratifying the trusts or in any way activating the trusts
had been made, and still has not been made. Inez Allred continued to live in the home until
approximately fall or winter 2005.
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IV.

THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO THE
PLAINTIFFS
Defendants contend that the Court erred in awarding attorney fees to the Plaintiffs

pursuant to the UCA Lis Pendens statute Section 78-40-2.5.
Section 78-40-2 UCA relates to a lis pendens, and is filed when there is an action
affecting the title to or the right of possession of real property.
This Notice of Action Pending was not a lis pendens, but was simply a Notice of
Action Pending in the pursuance of the collection of a debt, pursuant to Rule 7(f)(1) which
states: "...an order for the payment of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it
were a judgment." There was no requirement that the final judgment be signed and entered
by the Court, only that "an order for the payment of money" be awarded by the Court. In
this case, there was a judgment in the amount of $127,800.00. R.6941-6943 Addendum G.
Defendants were well within their rights to file a Notice of Action Pending since
Plaintiffs had failed and refused to prepare and submit the proposed order and judgment
pursuant to the order of Judge Stott on September 22, 2004. Although the order and
judgment was prepared, Plaintiffs never sent it to the Court. R. 6941-6943 Add. G and I.
Although the statute requires the awarding of attorney fees in lis pendens cases, this
was not a lis pendens. It was merely an attempt to collect a judgment. It should be noted,
however, that Plaintiffs filed a lis pendens against the Provo property at the time they filed
the lawsuit in Fourth District Court, on February 15, 2001 and failed and refused to remove
the lis pendens until the Court ordered it in October 2005. No attorney fees were awarded
to Defendants, even though they were forced to bring the motion against Plaintiffs for the
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removal of the lis pendens in Utah County. R. 7210-7211,7223, 7224, 7227. Addendum Q.
Plaintiffs knew at all times there was an order, ruling and judgment against them
from the Fourth District Court in favor of Defendants, either for the sum of $127,800.00 in
wrongly appropriated rent proceeds or for $4,065.49 in costs as determined by the Court.
Therefore, the award of attorney fees to Plaintiffs in this case was improper, and
incorrect.
CONCLUSION
Defendants were well within their rights when they filed a Notice of Action Pending
pursuant to URCP Rule 7(f)(1) since Plaintiffs inaction had deprived them of an abstract of
judgment. Plaintiffs were well aware at the time they filed their action in Davis County that
an order had been issued and they were also aware that they had prepared a judgment and
order and had failed to submit it to the Court for execution, pursuant to URCP Rule 7.
Such Davis County action was wrongly filed by Plaintiffs. Such actions by the
Fourth Judicial District Court were incorrect in granting summary judgment prior to all of
the parties having appeared, and in light of the fact that a judgment was in place with the
Fourth Judicial District Court at the time Plaintiffs filed their action in Davis County.
Additionally, it was Plaintiffs' own malfeasance that prevented the order and
judgment rendered on September 22, 2004 from being securely on file with the Fourth
District Court long before Plaintiffs filed their Davis County action.
The ruling of the Fourth Judicial District Court in granting Plaintiffs' summary
judgment and awarding attorney fees was improper and should be reversed.

WHEREFORE, Defendants, Appellees and Cross Appellants herein, pray for relief
as follows:
1.

That the Findings of Fact and judgment rendered by the Fourth District Court
that the Allred Trusts own the Provo property and are entitled to the rents
therefrom be affirmed.

2.

That the original judgment entered by the Honorable Gary D. Stott on
September 22, 2004 be reinstated.

3.

That the ruling granting Plaintiffs summary judgment and attorney fees in the
consolidated case be reversed.

DATED this 5th day of March, 2007.

A

CHARD G. ALLRED
Attorney for Appellees and Cross Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of the foregoing SUPREME
COURT BRIEF OF APPELLEES AND CROSS APPELLANTS were hand delivered
on the 5th day of March, 2007, to the following counsel of record:
Mr. Michael R. Carlston
Mr. Kenneth L. Reich
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-14. Possession of tenant deemed
possession of landlord.
When the relation of landlord and tenant has existed between any persons, the
possession of the tenant is deemed the possession of the landlord until the
expiration of seven years from the termination of the tenancy, or, where there
has been no written lease, until the expiration of seven years from the time of
the last payment of rent, notwithstanding that such tenant may have acquired
another title, or may have claimed to hold adversely to his landlord; but such
presumption cannot be made after the periods herein limited.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-25. Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years;
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in
writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for
any article charged on a store account; also on an open account for work, labor
or services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the
foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within-four years after the last
charge is made or the last payment is received;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of
Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent (a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in
specific situations limits the time for action to one year, under Section 25-619; (b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or [c] Subsection 25-6-6(1)
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-26. Within three years.
An action may be brought within three years:...
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action
in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the
facts constituting the fraud or mistake;
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-7. Adverse possession Possession presumed in owner.
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, the
person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have been
possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of the
property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under and in
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property has been held
and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years before the
commencement of the action.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 7(f)(1) Orders
An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order
entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of
money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial,
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative.
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 7(f)(2) Orders:
Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party
shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to
the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party
preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an
objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 12(h) Waiver of defenses:
A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or
by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable
party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also
be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on
the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it
appears by suggestion of the parties, or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action..
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-40-2 Lis Pendens
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property
the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and the defendant
at the time of filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such
answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the
county in which the property or some part thereof is situated a notice of the
pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties, the object of the
action or defense, and a description of the property in that county affected

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-40-2 Lis Pendens
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thereby. From the time of filing such notice for record only shall a purchaser
or encumbrance of the property affected thereby be deemed to have
constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency
against parties designated by their real names.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-40-2.5 Motions related to a notice
of the pendency of an action
(1) As used in this section: (a) "Claimant" means a person who filed a notice,
(b) "Guarantee" means an agreement by a claimant to pay an amount of
damages: (I) specified by the court; (ii) suffered as a result of the maintenance
of a notice; (iii) to a person with an interest in the real property that is the
subject of the notice; and (iv) if the requirements of Subsection (6) are met.
(d) "Notice means a notice of the pendency of an action filed under Section
78-40-2.
(2) Any time after a notice has been recorded pursuant to Section 78-40-2, any
of the following may make a motion to the court in which the action is
pending to release the notice; (a) a party to the action; or (b) a person with an
interest in the real property affected by the notice.
(3) A court shall order a notice released it: (a) the court receives a motion to
release under Subsection (2); and (b) the court finds that the claimant has not
established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the
real property claim that is the subject of the notice.
(4) If a court releases a notice pursuant to this section, the claimant may not
record another notice with respect to the same property without approval of
the court in which the action is pending.
(5) Upon a motion by any person with an interest in the real property that is
the subject of a notice, a court may require the claimant to give the moving
party a guarantee as a condition of maintaining the notice: (a) any time after a
notice has been recorded; and (b) regardless of whether a court has received
an application to release under Subsection (2).
(6) A person who receives a guarantee under Subsection (5) may recover an
amount not to exceed the amount of the guarantee upon a showing that (a) the
claimant did not prevail on the real property claim; and (b) the person seeking
the guarantee suffered damages as a result of the maintenance of the notice.
(7) A court shall award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party on any
motion under this section unless the court finds that: (a) the nonprevailing
party acted with substantial justification; or (b) other circumstances make the
imposition of attorney fees and costs unjust.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 59(a) Grounds.
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of
the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes;
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a
jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional
testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings
and conclusions and direct the entry of a new judgment.
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial.
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury...
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application,
which he could not, reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at trial.
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the
influence of passion or prejudice.
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or
that it is against law.
(a)(7) Error in law.
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 59(b) Time for motion.
A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of
the judgment.
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QUIT-CLAIM DEED

FOR-VALUE RECEIVED, DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. ALLRED, thl
Grantors, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto RICHARD G.
ALLRED, as trustee for THE RICHARD MARK ALLRED TRUST, THE ROBERT
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST, THE MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST, THE MICHAEL
CHRISTOPHER ALLRED TRUST, THE STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED TRUST, THE KARSN
ALLRED TRUST, THE NATHAN ALLRED TRUST, and THE MARY LEE ALLRED TRUST,
and to MARY L£B ALLRED, Trustee of the RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST, ail
of said trusts being formed through the laws of the State of Utah,
the Trustees residing in Bountiful, Davis County., State of Utah,
an undivided fifty-percent interest to be held jointly and equally
among the foregoing trusts, the following described premises in
"Prove City, Utah County, State'of Utah, to wit:
Commencing at a point oft" the North side of
1325 South Street, Provd, Utah, and the
Southeast corner of Commercial Tire Company's
property, which point is,South 289.5 feet and
East 1,504.71 feet from the Northwest corner •
of Section 18, Township 7 South, Range 3 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian? thence North 0°5Q'
East 526.0 feet; thence South 89°I0f East 414.0
feet; thence South 0°50' West 526.0 feet; thence
North 89°10' West-414.0 feet to the place of
beginning,
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances,
unto the said Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever.
DATED: This 30t-h day of Dece/oer, 1982
> ^ ^
/ID H« ALLRED

Cisia-J
INEZ H . / A L L R E D ~
:ATE~OF UTAH

I

)

'UNTY OF DAVIS )

ss.

Subscribed and sworn to on this frtrL <*ay of
.kjss^i/pt/^J
'? £tk
t before me, a Notary Public in and for said State,
rsonally appeared DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. ALLRED, his wi£e;/^ {ff" ...
»wn to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to £h<* ..;••*' '\°,
hin instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed :t»fee samer^ \*ju

Commission Expires: t-XA-fS

ary Public ,<i^>
Notary
Residing at: tk^M^t

J ^fe*.

.:'-' v".*
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1527 E.^aneyard Dr.
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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QUIT-CLAIM DEED

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. ALLRED, tf
Grantors, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto RICHARD G.
ALLRED, as trustee for THE RICHARD MARK ALLRED TRUST, THE ROBERT
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST, THE MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST, THE MICHAEL
CHRISTOPHER ALLRED TRUST, THE STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED TRUST, THE KAREN
ALLRED TRUST, THE NATHAN ALLRED TRUST, and THE MARY LEE ALLRED TRUST,
and to MARY LEE ALLRED, Trustee of the RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST, all
of said trusts being formed through the laws of the State of Utah,
the Trustees residing in Bountiful, Davis County, State of Utah,
an undivided fifty-percent interest to be held jointly and equally
among the foregoing trusts, the following described premises in
Provo City, Utah County, State of Utah, to wit:
pyg rO{jj ftf- 7-3^Commencing at a point on the North side of
^ ^ J /-» n -?cl325 South Street, Provo, Utah, and the
(Southeast corner of Commercial Tire Company's
EXHIBIT
property, which point is South 289.5 feet and
East 1,504.71 feet from the Northwest corner
? 'J
3/
of Section 18, Township 7 South, Range 3 East,
____
Salt Lake Base and Meridian? thence North 0°50'
East 526.0 feet; thence South 89°10f East 414.0
feet; thence South 0°50' West 526.0 feet; thence
North 89°10l West 414.0 feet to the place of
beginning,
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances,
unto the said Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever.
DATED: This 3rd
day of Jaxyujtry, 19 83

&
INEZ \{) ALLRED '
STATE OF UTAH

aA

)
: SS.

COUNTY OF DAVIS )
g

Subscribed and sworn to on this J*s— day of ^3-* bu**^.<.
before me, a Notary Public in and for said State,
1^3
personally appeared DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. ALLRED, his wife,
known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the
within instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed the same.
u

My Commission E x p i r e s : 8-/1

91?
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— v. r_J ^KZZ<-^

Notary P u b l i c
Residing a t :
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EXHIBIT
TRUST AGREEMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF

L~

^

°

STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED

TRUST AGREEMENT made this 27th day of December, 1982, between
David H. Allred and Inez H, Allred, his wife, of 330 North 1300 East,
City of Bountiful, County of Davis, state of Utah, herein referred to
as "Trustor" and Richard G. Allred of 1527 East Vineyard Drive City
of Bountiful, county of Davis, State of Utah, herein referred to as
"Trustee". Trustor and Trustee recite and declare that:
1. Trustor is now the owner of the property presently leased
to Mountain Bell Telephone in Provo, Utah, further described in Exhibit
*A"attached hereto.
2. Trustor desires to make provisions for the care and management
of such property and to provide for the collection of the income
therefrom and the disposition of both such income and such property
in the manner herein provided. For the reasons set forth above and
in consideration of the mutual covenants set forth herein, trustor
and trustee agree:
SECTION ONE
Transfer and Trust
Trustor, in consideration of acceptance by trustee of the trust
herein created, hereby conveys, transfers and assigns and delivers to
trustee its sucessors in trust and assigns, property or a portion of
property described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part'
hereof by this reference, which property together with all other property
that may from time to time be held by trustee hereunder, i s herein
referred to as "Trust Estate".
SECTION TWO
Disposition of Principal and Income
Trustee shall care for and manage the Trust Estate and collect
the income derived therefrom and, after the payment of all taxes and
assessments thereon and all charges incident to the management thereof
administer, apply and dispose of the net income therefrom in the corpus
thereof, as follows:
a) All net income benefits and or corpus are to be held in
trust for the benefit of the beneficiary herein for a period of
twenty-one years from the date of this instrument, at which time the
corpus of the trust, all accumulated income from the trust and other
property is to be distributed to the beneficiaries as follows:
The corpus and the accumulated income is to be distributed to the beneficiary, either in a lump sum or over a period of years as
determined by the trustee to be most beneficial to the beneficiary.
SECTION THREE
General Rules Regarding Disbursements
In any case in which trustee is authorized in its discretion
or is directed or both, to pay or distribute income to any beneficiary
whether a minmr or otherwise, trustee may in its sole discretion, at
'
any time, apply the full or any part of such inccme to or for the care,*
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comfort, maintenance, support, education, use or other benefit of such
beneficiary directly, instead of paying or distributing the same to
such beneficiary. In case any beneficiary shall be a minor or
incompetent, trustee shall in its sole discretion, make payment or
distribution of any property to which such minor or incompetent shall
be entitled hereunder to the guardian, legal or natural, the committee
or anyother legal representative wherever appointed, of such minor or
incompetent or to the person with whom such minor or incompetent shall
reside and a written receipt of the person or persons to whom any such
payments or distribution to so made, shall be a full and sufficient
discharge of trustee therefore, eventhough trustee may be such person
or one of such persons,
SECTION FOUR
Additions to Trust
Trustor, and any other person, shall have the right at any
'time to add property acceptable to the trustee to this trust and such
property, when received and accepted by trustee, shall become part of
the Trust Estate•
SECTION FIVE
Powers of Trustee
Trustee shall have full right, power and authority, in its sole
and absolute discretion and without authorization by any court to take
any action it may deem necessary without the necessity for the posting
of a bond, as follows:
a) To retai* indefinitely any property, real, personal or mixed and
to operate at the risk of the trust estate any property or business
that shall be transferred to trustee in trust by trustor or by
trustor's executor, regardless of any lack of diversification, any
risk, or any aonproductivity.
b) To sell* convey or otherwise dispose of the whole or any part
of any property at any time held hereunder at such times, for such
prices, to such party or parties in such manner, as trustee shall
deem advisable,
c) To make such purchases or exchanges at such times, for such
prices, in such manner upon such other terms and conditions as
trustee shall deem advisable and to invest and reinvest in such
securities, mrtages, insurance, insurance on the life of any
person, lease*, commodities, or other obligations either secured or
unsecured.
d) To payirr reserve sufficient funds to pay all expenses of
management aa£ administration of the trust estate, including
compensation «f trustee, all or any part of which m a Y / i n trustee's
discretion, ic charged either to income or principal of the Trust
Estate.
e) To do tfl acts, to institute all proceedings and to exercise
all other ricpts, powers, privileges that an absolute owner
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of the property would otherwise have the right to do, subject always
to the discharge of trustee's fiduciary obligations.
SECTION SIX
Duration of Trustee's Powers
All of the rights, powers, authorities, privileges and immunities
given to trustee by this agreement shall continue after termination
of the trust created hereby until trustee shall have made actual
distribution of all property held by it hereunder.
SECTION SEVEN
Trustee's Bond, Court Approval, and Personal Liability
No bond, surety or other security shall be required of trustee
for the faithful performance of its duties hereunder, any law of any
state or other jurisdiction to the contrary notwithstanding nor shall
trustee be required to qualify before, be appointed by or in the
absence of breach of trust, account to any court or to obtain the order
or approval of any court in the exercise of any power, discretion
hereunder. Trustee shall not be personally liable on any contract,
note or other instrument executed by it as trustee hereunder or for
any indebtedness of the trust estate.
SECTION EIGHT
Compensation of Trustee
The original trustee hereunder, and all successor trustees,
shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for their services as
trustees.
SECTION NINE
Resignation and Succession of Trustees
Trustee, or any successor, may resign at any time upon giving
written notice 30 days before such resignation shall take effect, to
trustor or after the death of trustor to all adult beneficiaries and
to a parent or quardian of any minor or incompetent beneficiary who
may then be receiving or entitled to receive income under this agreement.
SECTION TEN
Accounting
Trustee shall not be required to file annual or other
accounts in any court but shall render as he sees fit an accounting
each year to the trustor and or to the beneficiaries.
SECTION ELEVEN
Purpose and General Construction of Trust
The primary purpose and intent of trustor in creating the trust
under this agreement is to benefit the primary beneficiary which has
been named previously. The foregoing shall not, however, be deemed
to limit the discretion hereby conferred upon trustee.

SECTION TWELVE
Spendthrift Provision
No title or interest in the ^oney or other property constituting
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the principal of the Trust Estate, or in any other income accruing
therefrom or thereon shall vest in any beneficiary during the
continuance of the trust created hereby. All payments authorized
and provided to be made by trustee shall be made and shall be valid
and effectual only when paid to the beneficiary to whom the same
shall belong *>r otherwise, as herein provided.
SECTION THIRTEEN
Perpetuities Saving Clause
Any otl-^r term or provision of this agreement to the contrary
not^it^st^ndiM > *^ e trust created hereby shall not continue beyond <
but shall terminate twenty-one years after the death of the last
survivor of trustor, trustor's present spouse, and any beneficiary
named herein #nd living on the date of this agreementSECTION FOURTEEN
Revocation and Amendment
This t:fust shall be irrevocable and shall not be altered,
amended, revoKed or terminated by trustor or any other person.
Trustor herebV declares that his purpose in establishing the trust
is to provide for the housing, material comforts of the beneficiaries
during their lives and by this agreement trustor relinquishes
absolutely and forever all his possession or enjoyment of, or right
to the income from, the Trust Estate, and all his right and power
whether alone or in conjunction with others to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy the Trust Estate of the income therefrom.
Trustor hereby renounces for himself and his estate any interest,
either vested or contingent including any reversionary right or
possibility or reverting the principal and income of the trust.
DATED:

This 27th day of December, 1982.

Trustor

DAVJ/D H. ALLRED,

COUNTY OF DAVI5 )
ss.
STATE OF UTAH

)

On the .$d d a y o f ktr*o*.h.jJ tf<?£ > DAVID H. ALLRED and
INEZ H. ALLRED, his wife, affixed their signatures as Trustors
to the above entitled document, in my presence.
NOTARY PUBLIC «
My Commission Expires;

W

Residing at: *>*<*I*ZJMA
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ADDENDUM C

, Dep. Book-

by-

Ref.;

PageAddress*.

Mail tax notice to-

MIL;
COUNT.

:eo
.-..;: aiea

QLPuT f

WARRANTY DEED
DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. ALLRED, husband and wife
grantor
of S a l t Lake City
, County of
S a l t Lake
Stete of Utah, hereby
CONVEY and WARRANT to
TERRY WHITNEY, as to an undivided 12.5/* i n t e r e s t ,
SYLVIA AMELIA ALLRED WHITNEY, as to an undivided 12.5% i n t e r e s t , SYLVIA AMELIA ALLRED
WHITNEY T r u s t e e for the WILLIAM JESSE WHITNEY T r u s t , as t o an undivided 12.5% i n t e r e s t ,
and SYLVIA AMELIA ALLRED WHITENY, Trustee for the SHAUNELL WHITNEY T r u s t , as to an
undivided 12.5% i n t e r e s t .

of

grantee
for the sum of

P o c a t e l l o , S t a t e of Idaho

TEN AND No/ioo

^^EEsissrisrvii^irsSiasiHoS—-COLLARS,

the following described tract of land in
Cache
County,
State of Utah:
PARCEL 2: Lot 6 and the North 1/10 of Lot 7, Block 1 3 , P l a t "C" Logan Hay land
Survey, and f u r t h e r d e s c r i b e d as follows: Commencing a t t h e N o r t h e a s t corner
of s a i d Lot 6,and running thence South along the e a s t s i d e of s a i d Block 44 r o d s ;
thence West 40 r o d s ; thence North 44 rods to the Northwest corner of Lot 6 of
s a i d Block; thence E a s t 40 rods t o the place of b e g i n n i n g , c o n t a i n i n g 11 a c r e s
and s i t u a t e in the Northeast q u a r t e r of Section 29, Township 12 North of Range 1
East of the S a l t Lake Meridian.
Subject to easements, r e s t r i c t i o n s and r i g h t s of way a p p e a r i n g of record
or enforceable i n law and e q u i t y .
A.

day of

WITNESS, the hand s of said grantors , this
19 th
October
» A. D, 19 78
Signed in the Presence of
,f/
M-

'*'*q

DAVID H. ALLRED
INEZ H. ALLRED

STATE OP UTAH,
County of

0036

ss.

S a l t Lake

On. the
19 th
day of
personally appejared before me

October

, A. D. 19

78

D A V I g ^ JULt^D.and INEZ H. ALLRED, husband and wife
the s i g n a l ' S f ^ h e / w i t h i n instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that t h e ? executed the
sames

.«
Notary Public.
My commission expires

EXHIBIT K

January 20, 19 8fcaai«HJTig \n

Utah Title and Abstract
T « ~ ~ l ~ OOO -3C t

S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah

Company

BOOK

243 «6E668

2831

at.

,M. *

ri.t.T..--: • -CEO FOR
David K. Allred

$.00

. aid t-

,
.
Dep. Book
Page
by.
Dy
Return t o : kj6 B S t r e e t , S a l t Lake, City, Utah 84103
Mail tax notice to
Address

M

I iUioSH'13

. Ref!

MIL
CQUNT:
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WARRANTY DEED
DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. ALLRED, husband and wife
grantor
of Salt Lake City
, County of
Salt Lake
, State of Utah, hereby
CONVEY and WARRANT to
TERRY WHITNEY, as to an undivided 12.5% i n t e r e s t ,
SYLVIA AMELIA ALLRED WHITNEY, as to an undivided 12.5% i n t e r e s t , SYLVIA AMELIA ALLREI
WHITNEY Trustee for the WILLIAM JESSE WHITNEY Trust, as to an undivided 12.5% inter*
and SYLVIA AMELIA ALLRED WHITENY, Trustee for the SHAUNELL WHITNEY Trust, as to an
undivided 12.5% i n t e r e s t .
grantee
for the sum of

of P o c a t e l l o , State of Idaho
TEN AND NO/100
iHroThirlSoTa"nTval^^

the following described tract of land in
Cache
County,
State of Utah:
PARCEL 2: Lot 6 and the North 1/10 of Lot 7, Block 13, Plat "C" Logan Hayland
'Survey, and further described as follows: Commencing at the Northeast corner
of said Lot 6,and running thence South along the e a s t s i d e of said Block 44 rods;
thence West 40 rods; thence North 44 rods to the Northwest corner of Lot 6 of
' said Block; thence East 40 rods to the place of beginning, containing 11 acres
and s i t u a t e in the Northeast quarter of Section 29, Township 12 North of Range 1
East of the S a l t Lake Meridian.
Subject Co easements, r e s t r i c t i o n s and r i g h t s of way appearing of record
or enforceable i n law and equity.
Of- 1^0 - 000/

EXHIBIT

WITNESS, the hand s of said grantors , this
2nd
January
, A. D. 19 79

day of

Signed in the Presence of
ALLRED
Q

^ INEZ H. ALLRED

STATE OF UTAH,
County of

0058

88.

Salt Lake

On the
2nd
day of
January
personally appeared before m e
?..,
/ \
'DAVID HV.ALtKED and INEZ H. ALLRED, husband and wife
. the .signers

of the within instrument, w h o duly acknowledged t o m e t h a t

, A . D. 19 79

l

he v executed t h e

Notary Public.
My commission expires

FXHTRTT K

J a n u a r y 2 0 , 19 8fr pa i,Kng j n

Utah Title and Abstract

S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah •

Cnittnan*
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TRUST AGREEMENT made December 19th, 1979, between
David H. Allred of 330 North 13th East, Bountiful, County of Davis,
State of Utah, herein referred to as " t r u s t o r ,

lf

and

Sylvia Amelia Allred Whitney of Route 1, 2427 West Lacey Road,
Pocatello, State of Idaho, herein r e f e r r e d to as " t r u s t e e .

,f

T r u s t o r and Trustee recite and declare that:
1, T r u s t o r is now the owner of the property described as
11 Acres of Commercial Property at 1400 West and 1000 North, in
Logan, Cache County, State of Utah, and further described in Exhibit "A"
attached hereto.
T r u s t o r desires to make provisions for the c a r e and management
of such property and to provide for the collection of the income therefrom
and the disposition of both such income and such p r o p e r t y in the manner
herein provided.
F o r the reasons set forth above and in consideration of the mutual
covenants set forth herein trustor and t r u s t e e a g r e e :
SECTION ONE
Transfer and T r u s t
T r u s t o r , in consideration of acceptance by t r u s t e e of the trust
herein created hereby conveys, transfers, assigns and delivers to trustee
its s u c c e s s o r s in trust and assigns, property or a portion of property
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a p a r t hereof by this
reference, which property, together with all other property that may from
time to time be held by trustee hereunder, is herein r e f e r r e d to as "Trust
Estate. I f
SECTION TWO
Disposition of Principal and Income
T r u s t e e shall care for and manage the T r u s t Estate and
collect the income derived therefrom and, after the payment of all
taxes and a s s e s s m e n t s thereon and all charges incident to the
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TRUST AGREEMENT made
Allrcd of

'

itrcot.

OF

>be^ . I , 1978
«s C U y ,

between David H.
Oou * - of

, State of I'cah, herein referred to as "trustor"
n „ , .,

ana

• -. < of

Route 1 2427 West Lacey

Road, Pocatello, State of Idaho, herein referred to as "trustee".
Trustor and trustee recite and declare that:
1.

Trustor is now the owner of the property described as

11 Acres* of Commercial Property at 1400 West and 1000 North, ia
Logan, Utah, and further described in Exhibit "A" attached
hereto.

2.

Trustor desires to make provisions for the care and

management of such property and to provide for the collection
of the income therefrom and the disposition of both such
income and such property in the manner herein provided.
For the reasons set forth above and in consideration of the
mutual covenants set forth herein trustor and trustee agree:
SECTION ONE
Transfer and Trust
Trustor, in consideration of acceptance by trustee of the
trust herein created hereby conveys, transfers, assigns and
delivers to trustee its sucessors in trust and assigns, property
or a portion of property described in exhibit "A" attached hereto
and made apart hereof by this reference, which property together
with all other property that may from time to time be held by
trustee hereunder, is herein referred to as "Trust Estate".
SECTION TWO
Disposition of Principal and Income
Trustee shall care for and manage the Trust Estate and
collect the income derived therefrom and, after the payment of
all taxes and assessments thereon and all charges incident to the
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management thereof, admister, apply and dispose of the net
income therefrom in the corpus thereof, as follows:
a)

All net income benefits and or corpus are to be held in

trust for the benefit of the beneficiary
until such time as the said beneficiary reaches the age of
twenty-one years at which time the corpus of the trust all
accumulated income from the trrust and other property is to be
distributed to the beneficiary as follows:
One-fifth to be distributed each year for a period of
five years from the time of the beneficiary's twenty-first
birthday.
SECTION THREE
General Rules Regarding Disbursements
In any case in which trustee is authorized in its discretion
or is directed, or both, to pay or distribute income to any
beneficiary, whether a minor or otherwise, trustee may in its
sole discretion, at any time, apply the full or any part of such
income to or for the care, comfort, maintenance, support, education,
use or other benefit of such beneficiary directly, instead of
paying or distributing the same to such beneficiary,
b)

In case any beneificary shall be a minor or incompetent,

trustee may, in its sole discretion, make payment or distribution
or any property to which such minor or incompetent shall be entitled
hereunder to the guardian, legal or natural, the committee, or any
other legal representative, wherever appointed, of such minor or
incompetent or to the person with whom such minor or incompetent ah^l
reside, and the written receipt of the person or persons to whom
any such payments or distribution is so made, shall be a full and
..sufficient discharge of trustee therefor even though trustee may be
such person or one of such persons,
SECTION FOUR
Additions to Trust
Trustor, and any other person, shall have the right at any time
to add property acceptable to the trustee to this trust and such
property, when received and accepted by trustee, shall become part
of the Trust Estate.

2681
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SECTION FIVE
Powers of Trustee
Trustee shall have full right, power, and authority, in its
sole and absolute discretion and without authorization by any court
to take any action it may deem necessary without the necessity
for the posting of a bond, as follows:
a)

To retain indefinitely any property, real, personal or mixed

and to operate at the risk of the trust estate any property or
business that shall be transferred to trustee in trust by trustor
or by trustor*s executor, regardless of any lack of diversification,
any risk, or any nonproductivity.
b)

To sell, convey or otherwise dispose of the whole or any

part of any property at any time held hereunder at such' times,
for such prices, to such party or parties in such manner, as
trustee shall deem advisable.
c)

To make such purchases or- exchanges at such times, for such

prices, in such manner upon such other terras and conditions as
trustee shall deem advisable and to invest and reinvest in such
securities, mortages, insurance, insurance on the life on any
person, leases, commodities, or other obligations either secured or
unsecured,
d)

To pay or reserve sufficient funds to pay all expenses of

management and administration of the trust estate, including
compensation of trustee, all or any part of which may, in trustee's
discretion, be charged either to income or principal of the trust
estate.
e)

To to all acts, to institute all proceedings and to

exercise all other rights, powers, privileges that an absolute
owner of the property would otherwise have the right to do, subject
alwavs to the discharcre of trustee's fiduciary obligations.
SECTION SIX
Duration of Trustee's Powers
M l of the rights, powers, authorities, privileges and immunities
given to trustee by this agreement shall continue after termination

2631
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of the trust created hereby until trustee shall have made
actual distribution of all property held by it hereunder.
SECTION

SEVEN

Trustee's Bond, Court Approval, and Personal Liability
No bond, surety or other security

shall be required of

trustee for the faithful performance of its duties hereunder, any
law of any state or other 3urisdiction to the contrary notwithstandir
nor shall trustee be required to qualify before, be appointed by
or in the absence of breach of trust, account to any court or to
obtain the order or approval of any court m
power, discretion hereunder.

the exercise of any

Trustee shall not be personally

liable on any contract, note or other instrument executed by
it as trustee hereunder or for any indebtness of the trust estate.
SECTION EIGHT
Compensation of Trustee
The original trustee hereunder, and all successor trustees,
shall be entitled to reasonable compensation ^for their services
as trustee.
SECTION NINE
Resignation and Succession of Trustees
a)

Trustee, or any successor, may resign at any time upon

giving written notice 30 days before such resignation shall take
effect, to trustor or after the death of trustor to all adult
beneficiaries and to a parent or guardian of any minor or incompetent
beneficiary who may then be receiving or entitled to receive income
under this agreement.
SECTION TEN
Accounting
Trustee shall not be required to file annual or other accounts in
any court but shall render as he sees fit an accounting each year to
the trustor and or to the beneficiaries.
SECTION ELEVEN
Purpose and General Construction of Trust
The primary purpose and intent of trustor in creating the trust

0040
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under this agreement it to benefit the primary beneficiary
which has been named previously.

The foregoing shall not, however,

be deemed to limit the discretion hereby conferred upon trustee.
SECTION TWELVE
Spendthrift Provision
No title or interest in the money or other property constituting
the principal of the trust estate, or in any other income accruing
therefrom or thereon shall vest in any beneficiary during the
continuance of the trust created hereby.

All payments authorized

and provided to be made by trustee shall be made and shall be valid
and effectual only when paid to the beneficiary to whom

the same

shall belong, or otherwise, as herein provided.
SECTION THIRTEEN
Perpetuities Saving Clause
Any other term or privision of this agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding, the trust created hereby shall not continue
beyond, but shall terminate twenty-one years after the death
of the last survivor of trustor, trustor's present spouse, and
any beneficiary named herein and living on the date of this agreement.
SECTION FOURTEEN
Revocation and Amendment
This trust shall be irrevocable and shall not be altered,
amended, revoked or terminated by trustor or any other person.
Trustor hereby declares that his purpose in establishing the trust
is to provide for the housing, material comforts of the beneficiaries
during their lives and by this agreement trustor relinquishes
absolutely and forever all his possession or enjoyment of, or right
to the income from, the trust estate, and all his right and power
whether alone or in conjunction with others to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy the trust estate or the income therefrom.
Trustor hereby renounces for himself and his estate any interest,
either vested or contingent including any reversionary right or
possibility or reverting the principal and income of the trust.
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SYLVIA AMEIIA ALLRED WHITNEY, Trustee

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
)

0 n the
me DAVjo

H<

personally appeared before
ALLRED, Trustor, and SYLVIA AMELIA ALLRFD WHITNEY,

Trustee, the signers of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged
to me that they executed the same.

My Concise-ion Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

2677
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ADDENDUM D

HLED I
Fourth Judicial District! Co
1

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO DEPARTMENT0Unty'^tate ( U

2

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

INEZ H. ALLRED, et al,

—^K^rf—rrinp

MOTIONS

Plaintiffs,

Case
#010400765
Appeal #20051049-SC

vs.
QWEST CORPORATION, et al,

Judge Gary D. Stott

Defendants.

BE IT REMEMBERED

that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on January 23, 2004.
WHEREUPON, the parties represented through by counsel,
the following proceedings were held:

CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
(Electronically Videotaped Record)

ORIGINAL

PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR - LIC. 22-102811-7801
SALEM, UT 84653
PHONE: (801) 423-1009 FAX: (801) 423-2663
PAGE 1
©« 4K

Sixth, reference with respect to beneficial,
plaintiffs making reference to beneficial holding of the
Provo property.

I'm not going to limit people as to how

they want to argue or phrase how they're entitled to claim
the property.
about.

That's something that you can talk to a jury

If, if the plaintiffs want, want to claim that

they're holding beneficial title to the property the
defendants can argue about that.

That's something that's a

matter to be addressed to a jury.

I don't have to exclude

that type of reference or, or characterization the parties
want to use concerning the Provo property.

So I'm denying

that.
Seventh, preclude any claims that the plaintiffs
were entitled to rent from the Provo property.

Nobody

mentioned anything with respect to Judge Schofield's
ruling.

Judge Schofield's ruling was pretty clear.

ruling said what it said.

His

And a, as to that narrow issue his

ruling said the following:
The documents provided by Richard
Allred demonstrate that the property
leased by Qwest is owned by the trust,
David and Inez Allred having conveyed it
to the trust in 1982.

Though plaintiffs

assert that they have a colorable title
to the lease rents I don't see it, rather

COURT PROCEEDINGS
PAGE 108

1

on the face of the documents pertaining

2

to the properties, the parties, the

3

property is owned by the trusts and the

4

lease rent should be paid to the trusts.

5

So any claims that, that they were entitled to the,

6

to the monies, entitled to the rent, Schofield's, Schofield's

7

ruling stands.
Eight, precluding any reference to the Qwest

8
9

corporation being the plaintiff's tenants after the deeds

10

were executed in '82 and '83.

I'm going to deny that.

11

That's a matter of argument that the parties can make to the

12

jury as to the, as to the respective positions of, of the

13

parties.
Number nine, expert testimony of David Holmberg.

14
15

I'm going to grant it.

I'm going to exclude his testimony.

16

It's a fact issue for the jury.

17

they don't, the jury doesn't need Mr. Holmberg's testimony.

18

That's granted.

You put in the information,

Number 10, expert testimony of Charles Huber.

19
20

That's granted as well.

To give expert testimony as to the

21

ownership of the Provo property based upon tax documents,

22

things of that nature, that's excluded.

23

instruction will be given to the jury, they'll hear the

24

testimony, and the attorneys can make the argument without

25

Mr. Huber.

A proper

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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ADDENDUM E
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MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577)
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

2003
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and
through MARY A. JENSEN, Personal
Representative for the ESTATE OF
DAVID H. ALLRED, and INEZ H.
ALLRED,

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
No. 010400765

vs.
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and
as Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK
ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE
MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST;
THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN
JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN
ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED
TRUST, MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST,
and QWEST CORPORATION,
Defendants.

Judge Gary D. Stott

INTRODUCTION
Among the essential facts set forth in Plaintiffs' complaint are that Richard G. Allred,
attorney, tax preparer and advisor to his parents persuaded them that they should transfer their
Provo Property to "save taxes." Deeds were recorded based upon his advice and relying upon his
assurances that the transfer was only for tax purposes and did not actually transfer ownership. It
was never intended or agreed that ownership be transferred as conclusively demonstrated by the
subsequent conduct of the parties. After the deeds were recorded nothing changed. The parents
continued to receive the rents. The parents continued to control the Provo Property and
continued to be recognized as the Owner for all purposes by the Tenants. The parents paid the
taxes on the Provo Property and filed tax returns prepared by Richard G. Allred showing the
income from the Provo Property as their income. The parents negotiated changes in extensions
of the Lease on the Provo Property and did all of these things with the full knowledge of Richard
G. Allred and Mary Lee Allred, the putative Trustees of the Allred Trusts.
When the aging parents wished to convey the Provo Property to their church in 1992.
The putative trustees did not cooperate in such transfer, but also did not interfere in any way with
the parents continuing exercise of all ownership rights to the Provo Property. In June of 2000,
possibly assuming that the impasse that they had created had existed for long enough so that the
rights of the parents to take action were compromised, Richard G. Allred and Mary Lee Allred
persuaded the tenant that despite the fact that the Allred Trusts had made no claim nor asserted
any ownership rights to the Provo Property in the eighteen years following the recordation of the
deeds, that the Allred Trusts should nonetheless be recognized as the owner by the tenant. The
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tmant agreed to do so, but only upon receiving the signed acknowledgment of the Allred Trusts
through the putative trustees that " . . . notice of such conveyances [the quitclaim deeds] was not
provided Tenant prior to this third amendment [dated June 19, 2000] and Tenant has continued to
enter into lease agreements with the original owners David H. Allred and Inez H. Allred." Not
only did the putative trustees acknowledge this, but then agreed that among the essential
purposes of this third amendment was "to clarify ownership to the premises, as well as confirm
and ratify all previous amendments, the parties enter into the third amendment." Exhibit 10
Amendment ^[2.
Each of the counts in Plaintiffs' complaint can and will be proved as necessary.
Plaintiffs, however, are now entitled to summary judgment that Plaintiffs are the lawful owners
of title to the Provo Property by adverse possession. For purposes of this motion only, it is
accepted that the 1982-1983 quitclaim deeds are construed to be effective to convey title to the
Allred Trusts. Despite this construction which is construed in the light most favorable to the
party against whom summary judgment is sought, the subsequent activities following the
recordation of the 1982-1983 deeds demonstrates that the Plaintiffs have obtained title by
adverse possession.
Under U.R.C.P. 56, a party may obtain summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law. When a motion for summary judgment is made, a defendant may not simply rely on
allegations or denials in pleadings, but is required to set forth specific material facts showing
there is a genuine issue for trial. Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979). Mere speculation

-3-
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ADDENDUM F

Owner '.vhether or not it will purchase the property within thirty
(30) days after the mailing of notice as aforesaid, then, at
any time thereafter, without further notice, Owner may sell
the premises to any person for not less than the purchase price
and upon terns no more favorable to the purchaser than those
set forth in the offer communicated to Tenant; provided, however, that such sale shall be subject to all terms and conditions of* this Lease including all provisions of this Article XII.

ARTICLE XIII
Notices
Any notice desired or required to be given by one party
hereto to the other party hereto shall be given in writing,
mailed by registered mail, return receipt requested, postage
prepaid to the applicable address specified below:
Address of Owner:

David U. Allred
330 North 1300 East
Bountiful, Utah 84010

Address of Tenant:

Utah Chief Engineer
Mountain Bell
80 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

or such other address as either party shall give notice of
in writing to the other party, at any time or from timo to
time,

ARTICLE

XIV

Successors and Assigns
The terms, conditions and provisions of this lease shall
inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the respective
parties hereto, the personal representatives, executors and
administrators of the Owner, and the successors and assigns
of both Owner and Tenant,

•20-
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EXHIBIT
/

LEASE AGREFMENT

THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into as of the
day of

August, 1973

, by and between

26th

David H. Allred and

Inez H. Allred

, hereinafter,

whether one or more, jointly and severally called "Owner,"
and THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a
Colorado corporation, hereinafter called "Tenant," WITNESSETH:
That for and in consideration of the covenants and promises hereinafter contained, Owner and Tenant do hereby mutually
agree as follows:

ARTICLE
Property

I

Leased

The Owner hereby demises, lets and leases unto the Tenant,
and the Tenant hereby hires, rents and takes from the Owner
for the term hereinafter specified all of that certain parcel
of land and improvements thereon, situate, lying and being
in the bounty of ut*h, State of Ptah, particularly described
a? follows:
Commencing at a point on the North side of
1325 South Street, Provo, Utah, and the
Southeast corner of Commercial Tire Company's
property, which point is South 289,5 feet
and East 1,504.71 feet from the Northwest
corner of Section 18, Township 7 South,
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
thence North 0o50l East 526,0 feet; thence
South 89°10' East 414.0 feet; thence South
0°50f West 526.0 feet; thence North 89o10f
West 414.0 feet to the place of beginning.

ARTICLE II
Construction of Building
The Owner covenants and agrees, immediately upon the
execution of this lease, to proceed at Owner's sole cost and
expense, to construct and erect a building, identified as
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
INEZ H. ALLRED Et al,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
EVIDENTIARY HEARING

vs.

Case No: 010400765 DC

QWEST CORPORATION Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

GARY D STOTT
September 22, 2004

marilynn

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): INEZ H. ALLRED
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): MICHAEL R. CARLSTON
CORY D MEMMOTT
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARD G ALLRED
Other Parties: MARY LEE ALLRED
Audio
Tape Number:
GDS37CD
Tape Count: 8:40

HEARING
COUNT: 8:40
This matter comes befoie the Court for an evidentiary hearing.
The plaintiff, Inez Allred# is present with counsel, Michael
Carlston and Cory Memmott. Richard Allred and Mary Lee Allred are
present as defendants, pro se.
COUNT; 8:41
Richard Allred addresses the Court.
COUNT: 8:46
Michael Carlston makes his opening statement representing to the
Court that there is no need for an accounting to the Court,
COUNT: 9:00
Richard Allred declines to respond to the opening statement.
COUNT: 9:01
Mr Carlston responds.
COUNT: 9:04
Richard Allred responds requesting that an accounting be made.
Page 1
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Case No: 010400765
Date:
' Sep 22, 2004
Mr Allred responds.
COUNT: 11:49
Mrs Allred responds requesting clarification.
COUNT: 11:50
Mr Carlston responds.
The Court finds that based on evidence, the statute of limitations
does apply. Mr Carlston will prepare the order from today's
hearing.
Mr Allred questions the amount. He submits his motion to the
Court. Mr Carlston will respond in writing if he wishes by
10/16/04. Mr Allred will then have until 10/20/04 to respond.
COUNT: 11:55
Court is adjourned and ail are excused.

Page 3 (last)
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

1

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO DEPARTMENT* A ^

2

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH'"

rpPeputy

3
4

INEZ H. ALLRED, et al,

5
6
7
8

Evidentiary Hearing

Plaintiffs,

Case
Appeal

#010400765
#20040737-CA

vs.
QWEST CORPORATION, et al,

Judge Gary D. Stott

Defendants.

9
10
11
12
13

BE IT REMEMBERED

that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on September 22, 2004.
WHEREUPON, the parties represented through by counsel,
the following proceedings were held:

14
15
16
17

OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT

18

(Electronically Recorded Record)

19
20
21
22
23

ORIGINAL

24
25
PENNY C.
PHONE:

ABBOTT, CSR - L I C . 2 2 - 1 0 2 8 1 1 - 7 8 0 1
^Ififl
SALEM, UT 8 4 6 5 3
&LVZ\
(801) 423-1009
FAX: ( 8 0 1 ) 4 2 3 - 2 6 6 3
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1

Further, I find that the evidence establishes that

2

Richard, excuse me, that David and Inez Allred controlled the

3

rents as they wish.

4

As for the tax returns, the exhibits of which have

5

been received in this case, they claimed them as their

6

individual income, they wrote them off as depreciated with

7

respect to property interest.

8

preparer of the documents for the exhibits that have been

9

received, introduced here.

Richard Allred was the

He knew during the time of

10

preparation of the claim to the monies, that is the rents

11

that were being paid for the Provo property that, that those

12

monies, those rents, the depreciations all were being claimed

13

by David and Inez Allred individually, not by any trust, not

14

by any trustee, not by any other individual other than those

15

two persons.

16
17
18

Therefore, based upon the evidence presented the
court finds that the statute does apply.
And you prepare the document appropriately for the

19

ruling, Mr. Carlston.

20

MR. ALLRED:

21

inquiry of the court?

22

THE JUDGE:

23

MR. ALLRED:

Your Honor, may I make one more

Sure.
My assumption is then that the amount

24

that's owing to the trust is the amount that they originally

25

set up, approximate 127 whatever it was.

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1
2
3

THE JUDGE:

Whatever it...

That's approximately

that figure.
MR. ALLRED:

Okay.

Now, may I request the court

4

at this particular time I've prepared a motion.

5

that this amount is suitable for the application of

6

prejudgment interest.

7

calculable, it's a liquidated amount.

8

make a motion at this point that have that included in the

9

judgment with prejudgment interest.

10

respond, Your Honor.

12

THE JUDGE:

13

It's a sum certain, it's easily

MR. CARLSTON:

11

I believe

And I think I like to

I'd like to consider that and

You nvay respond to it.

You may

respond to it in writing.

14

MR. CARLSTON:

Thank you.

15

THE JUDGE:

16

Let me do this so we don't have any questions.

And Mr. Allred...

17

Tell me when you believe you can make the response.

18

give you the time you need.

19
20

MR. CARLSTON:

I'll

I'll be out of town next week,

Your Honor, because I h a v e —

21

THE JUDGE:

22

MR. CARLSTON:

23

THE JUDGE:

24

MR. ALLRED:

25

THE JUDGE:

October 16th?
That would be fine.

Thank you.

Mr. Allred, you have to October 29th.
For what purpose, Your Honor?
To respond to, to respond for

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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Mr. Carlston's response to your request if you want to do so.
MR. ALLRED:

Okay.

Let me, may I provide both the

court and (short inaudible, no mic).
THE JUDGE:

You can give it to him.

If there's,

I don't know what your giving me but assuming this goes to
the request you just m a d e —
MR. ALLRED:

Yes.

THE JUDGE:

—

if there's additional written

response you have until the 29th.
MR. ALLRED:

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE JUDGE:

Anything else, folks?

MR. CARLSTON:
housekeeping matter.

Your Honor, yes.

One other

The court has, may have a suggestion

for this having probably encountered this a number of times,
but when you have a case that's sort of sectioned on like
this it's sometimes difficult to, to make sure that
everything is resolved.
THE JUDGE:

I don't think there's anything

outstanding now.
MR. CARLSTON:

Well, specifically they have not

prepared an order on your July 26th ruling regarding adverse
possession.

And I'd be pleased to take a hand at that at the

same time I do the other and submit it and work it out just
so that it's all bundled up a n d —
THE JUDGE:

Do you have any problem with that if

COURT PROCEEDINGS
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1

he submits that to you?

2

MR. ALLRED:

No.

We, no one as I recall was ever

3

requested to write an order and therefore it wasn't done

4

so. . .

5
6

THE JUDGE:
submit i t —

7

MR. ALLRED:

8

THE JUDGE:

9

Why don't, why don't you do so and

Yes.
—

that along with the order you're

going to prepare for today.

10

MR. CARLSTON:

11

THE JUDGE:

12

MR. CARLSTON:

13

THE JUDGE:

14

folks, and you're all escused.

15

MR. ALLRED:

16

THE JUDGE:

17

Sure.

Would you please, Mr. Carlston?
Sure.

All right.

Thank you very much,

Thank you, Your Honor.
You're welcome.

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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ADDENDUM H

0771
MEMORANDUM TO OUR EXECUTRIX, MARY ALLRED JENSEN

Our contract with U. 5. West Communications, covering the property at
425 East 1325 South, Provo, Utah County, Utah, 1$ somewhat complicated* since
there are two distinct but correlated contracts covering the same property.
Our original contract with the Telephone Company was for ten years, with
options to rene^i for additional 10 year periods.
Finance to purchase the ground and construct the first building was obtained from Lincoln National Life Company, The monthly lease with the
Telephone Company was sufficient to pay off Lincoln National Life in the ten
year period and paid us $300 per month in addition*
The original lease ran from March 1st of 1974 to March 1st of 1384, at
which time Lincoln National Life was paid off in full.
Before the
the building be
for a period of
tract for a ten

contract had expired, the Telephone Company requested that .
enlarged* The Telephone Company entered into a second contract
ten years and four months, and also extended the original conyear period.

A loan was obtained from the Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Coa$any, sufficient to pay off the loan in ten years and give us a return of $300 per
month which the Telephone Company has been directed to send such monthly payment to the Genealogical Foundation Account # 21-31416-2, Oavid H. Allred,
Ine2 H« Allred, with Stephen James Allred as Trustee. This account will continue to receive the $300 monthly payment as long n^ the Telephone Company
extends its contract.
The $296,69 monthly payment on the second contract goes to Tracy Collins
Genealogical Foundation Account # 0052179-9, David H. Allred, Inez H. Allred,
together with Richard S- Allred, Trustee on the account. At our death, the
account becomes Richard's* The Telephone Company has bBM instructed to
divide the returns of the contract and any additional option exercised to
each of the above accounts. Since Richard has not been working and had no
money to pay off Mrs- Greaves, whose mortgage I assumed on the M B M Street
Home, and which Richard took over to pay off, has been receiving this amount.
Mother and I will control the disposition of the funds accumulating in
these two accounts during our life time.
This memorandum must be read in cooperation with Oarlene Nelson's letter
to me dated February 4, 1987, and the two contract summaries attached thereto*
The original contracts together with correspondence {a foot thick} are in my desk.
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LAW OFFICES

SNOW, C H R I S T E N S E N & M A R T I N E A U
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
I O EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR
POST OFFICE BOX 4 S O O O
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH BA I - 4 5 - 5 0 0 0
TELEPHONE ( 8 0 1 ) 5 2 1 - 9 0 0 0
FACSIMILE ( 8 0 I ) 3 6 3 - 0 4 0 0

K E N N E T H L.

WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER
(SOI) 3 2 2 - 9 I 3 0

REICH

November 19, 2004
Richard G. Allred
1660 West Broadway, Suite 302
Anaheim, California 92802
Richard G. Allred
Mary Lee Allred
1527 Vineyard Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010-1333
Cory Memmott
Plant, Wallace, Christensen & Kanell
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Allred v. Allred

Dear Richard and Cory:
Enclosed please find originals of the following documents: 1) Order Re: January 23,2004
Hearing; 2) Order Re: June 18, 2004 Hearing; 3) Order Re: July 26, 2004 Hearing; and 4)
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: September 22, 2004 Hearing. Please review each
of these orders and, if appropriate, approve the proposed Orders as to form. After approval,
please return the original signature pages to me for filing with the Court. Thank you for your
consideration of these items.
Also, please note that Oscar McConkie is listed on the Certificate of Mailing for the
Order RE: June 18, 2004 Hearing, and I have forwarded an original of this document to him for
his review and approval.
Very truly yours,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

£T
Kenneth L. Reich
KLR:PHS
Enclosures
cc: Oscar McConkie

MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577)
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H.
ALLRED,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF-FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE:
SEPTEMBER 22, 2004 HEARING

vs.
No.010400765
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and
as Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK
ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE
MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST;
THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN
JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN
ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED
TRUST, MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST,
and QWEST CORPORATION,
Defendants.

Judge Gary D. Stott

4.

Plaintiffs acknowledged receiving $395,814.95 in rent in excess of amounts paid

as mortgage on the property between 1983 and August 2000. Based upon the statute of
limitations, the Court reduces this amount and renders judgment in favor of the Allred Trusts to
$127,800.00, the amount of rents from the Provo Property retained by plaintiffs from March
1998 to March 2001, the three years preceding the Allred Trusts claim for an accounting.
5.

The Court, therefore, awards judgment in favor of the Allred Trusts and against

plaintiffs in the amount of $127,800.00.
In conjunction with the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court further
reviewed the motions by the parties and based upon the briefs submitted, the arguments made,
and for good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
6.

That Defendants' Motion in Limine Precluding Counter-Defendant From

Claiming a Statute of Limitations Defense as to an Accounting and Restoration of Trust Funds is
denied and the Court finds that defendants' counterclaim for an accounting is governed by the
three-year statute of limitations found in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26;
7.

That Defendants' Motion in Limine to Prohibit the Introduction of Any Evidence

of Any Payments to the Beneficiaries of the Trusts Without Sufficient Documentary Evidence,
i.e. Receipts, Cancelled Checks, Etc. is moot by reason of the Court's preclusion at trial of any
and all set-offs and disbursements against the Allred Trusts;
8.

That Defendants' Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs from Claiming Credit as

a Distribution from the Trust Proceeds Any Checks that Were Issued to Defendants from
Accounts Other than the Accounts to Which the Rent Proceeds Were Deposited is moot by

-6-

DATED this

day of

, 2004.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Gary D. Stott
Fourth District Court
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Richard G. Allred

Cory D. Mernmott
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
[PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE: SEPTEMBER
22,2004 HEARING was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this f\
day of November,
2004, to the following counsel of record:
Richard G. Allred
1660 West Broadway, Suite 302
Anaheim, California 92802
Richard G. Allred
Mary Lee Allred
1527 Vineyard Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Cory Memmott
Plant, Christensen & Kanell
136 East South Temple #1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a conformed copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE: SEPTEMBER 22, 2004 HEARING was
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this
day of November, 2004, to the following
counsel of record:
Richard G. Allred
1660 West Broadway, Suite 302
Anaheim, California 92802
Richard G. Allred
Mary Lee Allred
1527 Vineyard Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Cory Memmott
Plant, Christensen & Kanell
136 East South Temple #1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

N:\20874\l\Pleadings\order re 9-22-04 hearing, wpd
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MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577)
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

77V THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and
through MARY A. JENSEN, Personal
Representative for the ESTATE OF
DAVID H. ALLRED, and INEZ H.
ALLRED,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR
AMEND MEMORANDUM DECISION OR
FOR NEW TRIAL

vs.
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and
as Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK
ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE
MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST;
THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN
JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN
ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED
TRUST, MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST,
and QWEST CORPORATION,
Defendants.

No. 010400765
Judge Gary D. Stott

Plaintiffs Inez H. Allred and Mary A. Jensen, Personal Representative for the Estate of
David H. Allred ("Plaintiffs" or "plaintiffs"), submit the following memorandum of points and
authorities in support of its motion under Rules 52(b) and/or 59(a)(6) and/or 59(e), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure to amend the Court's findings in its January 11, 2005 Memorandum Decision or
for new trial. This motion is supported by a memorandum of points and authorities filed
herewith.
FACTS
1.

On December 17, 2004, the Court held a proceeding at which the Court received

evidence and argument concerning the defendants' "Motion for Award of Prejudgment Interest
on the Rents from the Provo Property Wrongly Withheld from the Trusts."
2.

The Court took the matter under advisement and on January 11, 2005 filed its

Memorandum Decision in the regard. See Exhibit A attached hereto.
3.

The Memorandum Decision states as follows: "The Court finds and the parties

stipulated that $127,800 was owed to the trust for March 1998 through August 2000." See
Exhibit A at p. 3.
4.

At no time have plaintiffs stipulated that they owed defendants any amounts. At

the hearing held September 22, 2004, the following exchange took place:
Judge Stott:

Mr. Allred:

Well, if there's a stipulation to it as to the
calculations and the amounts then there isn't any
need for testimony.
Well, we, that's... I think that that's true. And our
figures in this regard also match the figures of some
documents that the plaintiffs had prepared. So I
-2-

think that we, we are at that point in agreement.
Plaintiffs I suspect are going to claim that they have
various setoffs, but I suspect as well that that
probably should be something that they should
present rather than me.
Judge Stott: It is. Let me inquire of Mr. Carlston and Mr.
Memmott. Is there a stipulation, is there a
stipulation agreement concerning the document that
he's just given me?
Mr. Carlston: Your Honor, there is a stipulation regarding, or an
acknowledgment regarding the numbers. We
haven't double-checked the calculations and we're
not stipulating. But we did meet and did agree that
the rents from 1983 through August of 2000 when
the depositing of the, of the rents was taken away
from Mrs. Allred was $703,688.64. -We also agree
after a lot of effort that during that same period of
time $307,853.69 was paid on mortgages and that
by the process of subtraction the amount remaining
is $395,814.95. We, of course, would like to
address the statute of limitations questions and, and
the waiver questions later. By acknowledging these
amounts I don't wish the court to confer that we're
waiving any of the other claims or defenses here.
Judge Stott: No. I didn't, I didn't perceive it in that fashion.
See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript attached hereto as Exhibit B in it entirety, at pp. 5-6.
Following this exchange, counsel for plaintiffs argued at length as to plaintiffs' position that the
agreed-upon "numbers" were of no importance because plaintiffs had no duty to account to the
defendant trusts. Counsel asserted that "it's improper for there to even be an accounting required
here because there is no duty, and there is no basis in the pleadings for the court to require an
accounting." Id. at p. 12. The Court agreed that there is no basis for an accounting, yet ruled that

the parties had stipulated that plaintiffs owed the defendant trusts certain amounts that would
only be subject to the statute of limitations and not any setoffs or other affirmative defenses:
Judge Stott:

Mr. Carlston:
Judge Stott:
Mr. Carlston:

Judge Stott:

Mr. Carlston:

Judge Stott:

Mr. Carlston:

I'm going to, I'm going to allow you to put on
testimony and evidence with respect to the
application of the statute [of limitations].
Okay.
With respect to concerning the question of setoffs,
that's precluded.
And would the court so that I'm clear, tell me, help
me understand the reason that evidence on setoffs is
precluded?
Yes, I can. With your, with your argument and
presentation here this morning and the information
that both sides have discussed, and my finding that
there is not a justification by the pleadings for the
accounting, it is my perspective that with the
agreement as to the figures that I've referred to
earlier and those three sets, I do not need to address
nor am I, nor am I required to do so the issue of
setoffs. And where I have concluded that, that no
further proceedings will take place concerning the
question of accounting the only application that I
have to hear that affects those numbers is that of the
statute of limitations and not setoffs.
And, and so even though they have not, they have
not pled anything other than the accounting, and the
court's ruled there's no basis for an accounting, the
court's granting them a judgment on a cause of
action that, that hasn't been pled.
I have granted them, with the stipulation of all
parties, the judgment that the trust is entitled to
those three figures, that bottom line of $395,814.95.
Okay. So the record is clear, Your Honor, the
plaintiffs never stipulated to that. We stipulated
that subject to our other claims and defenses those
were the numbers. And I recognize the court has
the authority to do what it's doing but I also have an
obligation to make sure the record is clear that, that

there was no stipulation of the sort the court has just
characterized.
Judge Stott: 111 hear you on the statute.
Mr. Carlston: Call Mr. Allred.
*

*

*

Id. at pp. 29-30.
ARGUMENT
Under Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a "court may amend its findings or
make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly." Likewise, Rule 59(a)
provides that the Court "may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional
testimony, amend findings of fact anc conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,
and direct the entry of a new judgment: [based on] (6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law." Although the Memorandum Decision is not a
"judgment" according to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is appropriate to consider that the
Memorandum Decision subject to these rules because it appears to make "findings" and
"conclusions" and is likely to be relied upon by the parties.
On page three of its decision, the Court stated that the "Court finds and the parties
stipulated that $127,800 was owed to the trust for March 1998 through August 2000." Contrary
to the Court's finding, however, plaintiffs have never stipulated that they owed the defendant
trusts any amount of money, for any time period, or on any basis. Plaintiffs, therefore, request
that the Court issue an order amending its Memorandum Decision which can be clarified to
reflect that plaintiffs have never stipulated to owing the defendant trusts any amount or,

-5-

735, l

alternatively, for a new trial on this issue. Plaintiffs' limited stipulation made to the Court on
September 22,2004 was as to the difference between the amount of rents collected and the
amounts paid on mortgages on the property from which rents were received. The record clearly
establishes that plaintiffs maintained objection and defense to the duty to pay any amount. The
transcript of the September 22, 2004 proceeding is transparent in this regard and plaintiffs
respectfully request the Court's order amending its findings and conclusions found in the January
11, 2005 Memorandum Decision.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs request that the Court alter or amend its findings to reflect that plaintiffs have
never stipulated to owing the defendant trusts any amount at any time or, alternatively, for a new
trial on this issue.
DATED this 2 f l

day of January, 2005.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Michael R.^Carlston
Kenneth L. Reich
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
mailed,first-class,postage prepaid, on this ^
day of January, 2005, to the following counsel
ofrecord:
Richard G. Allred
1660 West Broadway, Suite 302
Anaheim, California 92802
Mary Lee Allred
1527 Vineyard Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Terry Plant
Cory Memmott
Plant, Wallace, Christensen & Kanell
136 East South Temple #1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

N:\20874\l\Pleadings\mem re amendment of decision l.wpd
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and through
MARY A. JENSEN, Personal Representative
for the ESTATE OF DAVID H. ALLRED, and
INEZ H. ALLRED,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 010400765
Judge Gary D. Stott

vs.

RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and as
Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK ALLRED
TRUST; THE ROBERT MATTHEW ALLRED
TRUST; THE MARY MICHELLE ALLRED
TRUST; THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN JAMES
ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN ALLRED
TRUST; THE NATHAN ALLRED TRUST;
THE MARY ALLRED TRUST; MARY LEE
ALLRED, as Trustee for THE RICHARD G.
ALLRED TRUST; and QWEST
CORPORATION,
Defendants and Appellees.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Request and Motion for the Award of
Prejudgment Interest on the Rents from the Provo Property Wrongly Withheld from the Trusts.
The Court has reviewed the file, the pertinent cases, listened to oral arguments on the matter and
being fully advised, issues the following memorandum decision.

7198

BACKGROUND
On September 22, 2004, Defendants filed a Request and Motion for the Award of
Prejudgment Interest on the Rents from the Provo Property Wrongly Withheld from the Trusts,
and Memorandum in Support Thereof. Defendants base their request on the Court's previous
Order entitling them to rents and profits from the Trust's Provo Property since approximately
January 1983. Defendants claim the amounts of rent, various mortgages and other payments
subtracted therefrom are known commodities.
On September 29, 2004, Defendants submitted an Addendum to the September 22
Motion. Defendants cited and agreed with Plaintiff Inez Alfred's Trial Brief Regarding
Accounting dated September 21,2004, which stated that the "Amount of Rents Less Some
Expenses from 1983 to 8/2000 has been agreed upon by the parties...the total amount from March
1998 to August 2000 is $127,800.00."
In response, on October 18, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Request and Motion for the Award of Prejudgment Interest. Plaintiffs claim that
Defendants are not entitled to prejudgment interest, but if the Court should decide otherwise,
Defendants should only be awarded from the time they requested the return of rents in their
Counterclaim of 2001.
On October 28, 2004, Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Opposition to Defendants' Request and Motion for the Award of Prejudgment Interest.
Defendants reassert Plaintiffs admission to the Court of the rent amounts received less any
mortgage payments from March 1998 through August 2000. Additionally, Defendants rely on a

Ruling Page 2
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document from Zions First National Bank providing records of Lease Deposits on the Provo
Property from September 1988 through August 2000. On December, 17, 2004, the Court held a
hearing on the issue of prejudgment interest.
ANALYSIS AND RULING
I. Prejudgment Interest
Defendants provide a litany of case law establishing that "Utah courts award prejudgment
interest in cases where * damages are complete5 and can be measured by 'fixed rules of evidence
and known standards of value.5" Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064 (Utah 2003).
Defendants claim that the amount of rents is easily calculable in this case based on the stipulated
amount from March 1998 through August 2000 and the Zions First National Bank document.
However, Plaintiffs claim that a dispute remains as to the amounts of set-offs and credits
from 1983 through August 2000. Although the rents are easily calculable from September 1988
through August 2000, Defendants are requesting prejudgment interest on the amount owed to the
trust, not simply rent amounts, for that time period. Calculating the monthly rent amounts does
not establish the monthly amounts owed to the trust. Rent is a known standard of value, but the
damages from 1983 through August 2000 are not complete since set-offs and credits can remain
in dispute.
The only damages that are complete and can be measured by "fixed rules of evidence and
known standards of value" are from March 1998 through August 2000. The Court finds and the
parties stipulated that $127,800 was owed to the trust for March 1998 through August 2000.

Ruling Page 3

71

II. Time Frame
Plaintiffs rely on the Utah Supreme Court decision, Stoker v. Huntington Cleveland
Irrigation Co,, 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983), which provided that the plaintiff was entitled to
prejudgment interest only from the time plaintiff demanded the return of surplus payments.
Plaintiffs claim that if Defendants are awarded prejudgment interest, it should only begin to accrue
from the date when Defendants first demanded payment to the trust; Defendants first demanded
payment in their 2001 Counterclaim.
Defendants argue that Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. The Utah Division of State Lands and
Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996) overrules Staker. In Trail Mountain Coal Co., the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
The general rule is that 'where the damage is complete and the amount of loss is fixed
as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures, interest
should be allowed from that time. . . ' In Consolidation Coal, we followed Bjork,
holding that prejudgment interst on Consol's overdue royalties accrued from the date
the payments were due . . . [BJecause Staker presented a relatively unique fact
situation involving a refund of overpaid amounts, we hold that Consolidation Coal
controls rather than Staker. Id. at 1371. (Citations omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court does not overrule Staker, but distinguished it from the general
rule as a unique situation. According to the general rule followed by Utah courts, prejudgment
interest should be allowed from the particular time where damage is complete and the loss is fixed
as of that time.
In this case, from March 1998 through August 2000, damages were fixed and complete at
$127,800. Therefore, in following the general rule set forth in Trail Mountain Coal Co., this
Court orders prejudgment interest to be paid to Defendants beginning from August 2000 on the
Ruling Page 4
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amount of $127,800.
DATED this / /

day of January, 2005.

V-rio 'f4i A :«T
f

x
^-^d tk\ *
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ADDENDUM K

4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
INEZ H. ALLRED Et al,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
INCOURT NOTE

vs.

Case No: 010400765 DC

QWEST CORPORATION Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD
July 28, 2 005

teria

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): CORY D MEMMOTT
MICHAEL R CARLSTON
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARD G ALLRED
Other Parties: MARY ALLRED
Audio
Tape Number:
AWS 2 6-401
Tape Count: 12:04-12:54

HEARING
This matter comes before the Court for a hearing. The Courts
intent is to rule on matters raised at trial on July 20, 2005. The
first matter addressed is the claim for off set that Ms. Allred has
submitted as exhibit A-12.
Upon review the Court does not accept her conclusions and denies
such claim for the set off covered by checks or amounts without
checks.
As to the Federal and State taxes and the tithing that was
overpaid or the contributions, the Court denies any offsets or set
offs in this matter. The defense of waiver is addressed cis well as
the Quit Claim.
The Court finds affirmative defenses raised by Inez Allred and not
considered previously by Judge Stott, carry today in this case, and
thus concludes that trusts are not entitled to an actual judgment
against Inez Allred.
The Court will not accept any of the other defenses that have been
raised. The Court concludes that the waiver and estoppel are
Page 1
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Case No: 010400765
Date: " Jul 28, 2005
defenses which are valid. Counsel is to prepare the Findings from
today's hearing and the hearing before Judge Stott.
COUNT: 12:19
Mr. Memmott addresses the court regarding issues from the letter
dated April 2 0th.
COUNT: 12:20
Mr. Allred addresses as to the order from April 2nd.
COUNT: 12:23
Mr. Memmott is to prepare an amended order from the April 11th
hearing.
COUNT: 12:35
Mr. Memmott addresses as to the order from the July 2 6th hearing,
exhibit F. Discussion ensues.
COUNT: 12:38
Mr. Allred addresses.
COUNT: 12:41
Mr. Memmott addresses.
COUNT: 12:42
Counsel is to prepare a correct order from the proposed orders
addressed. Discussion ensues. The Court amends the order by
interlineation in open court. Counsel is to prepare a new order
and have Mr. Allred review prior to submitting for signature.
COUNT: 12:52
Mr. Carlston addresses the court as to the Davis County matter.
The Court states that the case was to be sent here and has not been
received yet. Court is adjourned for the day.
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ADDENDUM L

4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
INEZ H. ALLRED Et al,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
5 DAY JURY TRIAL

vs.

Case No: 010400765 DC

QWEST CORPORATION Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DAY 1

GARY D STOTT
July 26, 2004

Clerk:
keris
Reporter: LIVINGSTON, ANNI
ANNIL
PRESENT
Defendant(s): TRUSTEE FOR RICHARD ALLRED MARY LEE
Plaintiff's Attorney(s}: MICHAEL R. CARLSTON
CORY D MEMMOTT
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARD G ALLRED
PETER STIRBA

TRIAL
Off the record. The jury panel is sworn and fills out the
questionnaire. They are excused until the following morning.
COUNT: 9:50
On the record. All parties are present and ready to proceed. The
Court informs counsel of the jury panel's status. The Court
discusses with counsel the motions in limine filed, the cut off
date set in April, and any settlement efforts. Counsel in
response. The Court will hear the motions in limine.
COUNT: 10:01
Mr. Carlston argues the motion to strike the documents of Mr.
Allred and Mr. Stirba. This motion touches on the motion in limine
re: taxes, motion in limine re: statute, and motion in limine re:
tax returns. Mr. Memmott, Mr. Allred, and Mr. Stirba in
response. Mr. Stirba indicates that the motion in limine re:
video has been resolved.
The Court indicates that Mr. Stirba may participate as far the
Page 1
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Case No:^010400765
Date:
' Jul 26, 2004
adverse possession claim is concerned, as may Ms. Allred.„ Mr.
Meipmott will not participate in the adverse possession portion of
the case.
Mr. Stirba addresses the Court regarding the defamation claim and
how it involves him. Regarding the other two claims Mr. Allred
should be able to represent himself. Counsel in response. The
Court indicates it will make a decision tomorrow.
COUNT: 10:48
The motion in limine regarding demonstrative aids is argued by
counsel. The Court indicates the exhibit may be electronically
enlarged or highlighted. Mr. Allred raises his objection to audio
tapes or dramatizations. The Court indicates on the video
depositions that the video will not used, only the transcript. If
the witness is not present, then the video may be used. The Court
al'so indicates that documents may be used in counsel's opening
statements, if agreed upon prior to usage.
COUNT: 10:56
The motion in limine regarding the accounting counterclaims is
addressed. The Court indicates that it will be the procedure.
Proper procedure will be followed.
COUNT: 11:01
The motion in limine regarding limitations on the witnesses
submitting evidence regarding a secret agreement is addressed by
counsel. The Court indicates this matter has already been ruled
on.
COUNT: '11:02
The motion in limine precluding the defendants addressing the
transfer of the new owner is addressed by counsel. The Court rules
that its previous finding will remain -- the preclusion will exist.
If the the defendant opens the door regarding this issue
then the plaintiff may pursue it.
COUNT: 11:13
The motion in limine on the claim for adverse possession is
addressed by counsel. The Court grants the motion, finding it is
well-taken. The adverse possession claim is denied. The Court
clarifies that the motion in limine is granted -- this does not
mean any kind of motion for summary judgment has been granted.
COUNT: 12:16
Based on the Court's ruling on the motion in limine regarding
adverse possession, Mr. Stirba withdraws his other motions in
limine.
COUNT: 12:17
Mr. Memmott addresses the Court regarding Judge Schofield's ruling
Page 2
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Case! No: 010400765
Date;:
Jul 26, 2004
1

on the counterclaim of defamation. Counsel in response. The Court
indicates that the defamation claim and Inez Allred's defenses to
that will be presented to the jury. The jury will
choose what they feel is believable.
COUNT: 12:24
Counsel address the Court regarding the statute of limitations.
Mr. *Stirba is excused from further involvment in the case. The
Court indicates that the letters will not be recieved, including
any testimony referring to the letters.
' COUNT: 12:36
Mr. Memmott addresses the Court regarding Richard Allred's
testimony as a witness. The Court will handle each objection as it
may or may not come up. Mr. Memmott is encourage to make those
objections. The Court is in recess.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
F , L E D

DAVID H . ALLRED AND
INEZ H. ALLRED,

)
)

Plaintiffs,

) CASE NO. 010400765

RICHARD G. ALLRED, ET AL.,
Defendants.

)
)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GARY D. STOTT
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
125 NORTH 100 WEST
PROVO, UTAH

84 601

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
HEARING ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE
JULY 26, 2004

Reported by:

«

Wi_Deputy

)

VS.

r*

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah pounty, Sta^ofUtah

Anni Livingston, RPR, CRR

M63
CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT

for the Court to consider any kind of a diversion such as the

1

And the dilemma that they have is that, after the

2

quitclaim deed was signed and after this fiction takes place

one that he suggested. And, as a matter of fact, I suggest in

3

that now it's their tenant, then David and Inez renewed the

my response on this - 1 think they've misstated the Pender

4

lease in their own name in 1984. And then they made other

case and they respectfully should withdraw their claim that it

5

modifications to the lease in 1987. Then they made further

supports their position.

6

modifications to the lease in 1994. Then they made further

MR. STIRBA:

7

modifications to the lease in 1998.

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

MR. STIRBA:

First, Judge, this concept of they

8
9

Now, I do not believe that, even on a contractual

May 1 make three small points?

basis, the successors and assigns language would track all of

signed this lease and they signed this lease and they signed

10

that. But, regardless if it did, the point still is that -

this amendment and signed this amendment and they said, "We

11

the question is, can you possess adversely through a tenant?

were the owners," well, remember the facts of this case are

12

The law is uniform, from all the jurisdictions where we've

they never told Qwest what they did. Because, if they had

13

been able to locate authority, that you can. And then the

told Qwest what they did, Qwest would have done precisely what

14

question is, how do you determine whose tenant someone is?

Qwest did in 2000 when it first found out who the record title

15

And then you look at the conduct. The conduct is the issue in

owner was. They would have said, "Sorry. We're not going to

16

adverse possession. We possess through the tenant.

enter into any leases with you. We're going to enter into a

17

lease with the trustees."

As a matter of fact, I think, with the third

The proof is in the pudding. They didn't know until

18

amendment to the lease, with the part that Mr, Stirba didn't

19

read on the third amendment, they don't challenge that Qwest

20

entered into these agreements with David and Inez Allred. And

Court. And to suggest that somehow you can fail to disclose

21

I believe that, by doing that, there indeed will be a motion

what you've done and then say, "Yeah, but they said we're the

22

on our part relating to whether or not they've waived their

owner; yeah, but they said we're the owner." They didn't

23

claim to contest adverse possession.

24
25

2000. That's the point of that language that I read to the

know. Once they knew, they said, "Sorry. We're not going to
deal with these guys. We're going to deal with these guys."

In terms of the other things Mr. Stirba suggested, I

That's exactly what happened.

don't think that there's any reasonable basis under the facts

76

75

Second point is, it gets back to this anomalous way
this has been presented where you're trying to somehow regain

I'm here to tell you I'm in actual possession of that space
with the rest of the people in my firm. My lessor is not in

title as opposed to quiet title. The whole point is, in '91,

actual possession of that space. Does the lessor have some

when David goes to Richard and says, "Hey, I want these things

contractual permissive rights at some point for some purposes

deeded back," and Richard said, "Sorry; I'm not going to do

to enter into that space? Absolutely. But to equate that

it; I've got a fiduciary responsibility," that's when you

with actual possession I would submit is not well founded.

bring your lawsuit. The fact that they go and they sit on

Our supreme court says you must be in actual

their hands, do nothing, absolutely nothing, until 2000 when

possession. I guess at some point they could change it and

9

there's a new lease with Qwest and the rents now go to the

say actual possession means you can do it through a tenant.

10

trustee - that's what precipitated this lawsuit.

But actual possession doesn't mean you can have a tenant there

11
12

That's the problem. When you wait and you don't do
anything, then you can't come into court when you no longer

and that's tantamount to actual possession. It isn't. It
flat-out isn't.

13

have an existing title and you have no longer any possession

14

and say, "Well, now we want to quiet title." Sorry. You

15

should have done that back in '91 when you knew there was a

motion in limine re Plaintiffs adverse possession through

16

title dispute. And the fact that you waited — guess what? ~

possession of a tenant dated July 16th, not filed with the

17

means your claim is now dissipated.

Court until July 19th, however, having considered all of that

18
19

The final point I'd like to make, Judge, is relating

Those are my three arguments in response.
THE COURT:

The Court, in response to Defendant's

information, having heard counsel's arguments today and their

to the concept of actual You know, the case law in Utah is

presentation, rules in favor of Defendant's motion and grants

20

very clear. The Royal Street [phonetic] case, land company

the motion based upon the information argued. I find that the

21

case, doesn't talk about constructive. It doesn't talk about

motion is well taken. The claim for adverse possession made

22

claiming through a tenant. It talks about being in actual --

by Plaintiff is denied.

23

that's the language of this case and all the case law -

24 ! possession.
25

MR. CARLSTON:
THE COURT:

Judge, I have a law office, and I have a lease. And

So you're granting summary judgment?

I'm granting the motion in limine.

That's how it was filed, and that's how it was structured.

CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
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1 I That's the very reason I said file your things before the 16th

properly filed in terms of its designation and time." I'm

2

of July. All of you. Some of you sat here saying, "We did it

just saying nobody's complied with anything here so I'm taking

3

ail before the 16th." That wasn't even dated until the 16th.

them as they're filed. It's filed as a motion in limine, and

4
5

Number 2: Motion in limine re interpretation of

I'm ruling on it as a motion in limine.

trust agreements.

6

MR. CARLSTON:

MR. STIRBA:

That's just a straightforward parole

7 | evidence issue, Your Honor. W e have these trust documents.
8
9

THE COURT:

11

THE COURT:

I don't even know what we have to argue

here today.

10

Weil, it sort of rings that way, doesn't

it? But it's not structured in that fashion in terms of the
motion here.

MR. STIRBA:

At this point, I guess we don't really

MR. CARLSTON:

have-

12

In effect, it's a motion for summary

judgment.

I just wanted to make sure the record

is clear.
MR. MEMMOTT:

I guess, Your Honor, I still have some

THE COURT:

I've granted the motion in limine. The

13

defense of counterclaim issues. I did file an opposition to

motion in limine precludes Plaintiff going forward with the

14

that motion.

claim of adverse possession. That's what it does. You're

15
16

MR. CARLSTON:

Can I make one more inquiry, Your

right, Mr. Carlston.

Honor?

17

MR. CARLSTON:
THE COURT:

18

Yes, sir.

MR. CARLSTON:

With respect to the motion not being

19

filed on the 16th versus the 19th, I'm not sure I know what

20

the Court was referring to.

21

THE COURT:

Does the Court care to make any more

observations on the basis for the ruling so I might understand
this?
THE COURT:

I accept the defendant's position as

argued and presented in the memorandum. I find there are no
Other than I'm extremely dissatisfied

genuine issues with material fact or questions of law that

22

with the failure of everybody to file what you were supposed

would defeat the position of the defendants as taken on this
motion. And, except for the proposition stated in argument

23

to file when you were supposed to file it. Now counsel come

24

into Court and say, "It's a motion for summary judgment, and

No. 1, which I already articulated, I find in favor of the

25

it should have been filed a long time ago. Now it's not

defendants.

80

79

MR. CARLSTON:
THE COURT:

On all of the other points.

Yes, sir. I will acknowledge with you

that, on the Pender case, it offers some interesting reading
in terms of interpretation.
MR. STIRBA:

Judge, in light of that, the other

from the standpoint of me representing the trustee and

THE COURT:

Does that mean you withdraw your motion

THE COURT:

Already been argued. Subsumed in our

Resolved based upon the ruling.

Which takes us now to "Other," Plaintiffs' motion to
strike motions in limine.

I'll be happy to hear you on that.

MR. MEMMOTT:

MR. STIRBA:

Yes, Your Honor.

12

THE COURT:

It's withdrawn. Do you withdraw the

Your Honor, on No. 6, I had filed an

opposition related to the counterclaim.
THE COURT:

in limine re: interpretation of trust agreements?

11

13

MR. STIRBA:

MR. MEMMOTT:

defending the adverse possession claim.
9

Schofield's ruling has already been argued.

argument, Judge.

motions in limine I think are obviously not worth pursuing

10

Number 6, motion in limine regarding Judge

Your Honor, in regards to the

counterclaim, I think it's not properly allowed for the jury
to view his statement that on the face of the documents the

motion in limine re: time period?

14

MR. STIRBA:

Yes.

property is owned by the trusts and lease rents should be paid

15

THE COURT:

It's withdrawn.

to the trust. In regards to the defamation counterclaim, the

Number 4, motion in limine with respect to gifts to

standard is, based on the facts available to Inez, once she

18

MR. STIRBA:

The statement against Inez is that she claimed her son took

19

MR. RICHARD ALLRED:

16
17

made the statement, was that statement substantially true?

Allreds?
Yes, Your Honor.
Wait a minute.

her property; he switched the accounts. I believe I'm

20

MR. STIRBA:

We withdraw it.

entitled to show where those rents were going to in August of

21

THE COURT:

It is withdrawn.

2000, prior to August of 2000, to provide a basis for Inez's

Number 5, motion in limine with respect to validity

statement as to why she said what she said.

24

MR. STIRBA:

I withdraw it.

Schofield's ruling or the trust documents or the lease, it

25

THE COURT:

It's withdrawn.

would have to be found that Inez didnt have a belief or her

22
23

For a finding to be found in regards to Judge

of title?
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Individually and as Trustee.
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and
through MARY A. JENSEN, Personal
Representative for the ESTATE O F
DAVID H. ALLRED, and INEZ H.
ALLRED,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually
and as Trustee for THE RICHARD
M A R K ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY
MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST; THE MICHAEL
CHRISTOPHER ALLRED TRUST; THE
STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE
KAREN ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED
TRUST; MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST;
and QWEST CORPORATION,
Defendants and Appellees.

NOTICE OF ACTION
PENDING

Civil No. 010400765
Judge Gary D. Stott

RICHARD G. ALLRED and MARY LEE ALLRED,
Counter-claimants,
vs.
DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and through
MARY A. JENSEN, Personal representative for
the Estate of DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H.
ALLRED, and DOES I through 100, inclusive,
Counter-defendants.

7957

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that there is an action pending in the Fourth Judicial
District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, in which a Ruling has been rendered against
David H. Allred, his estate, by and through his personal representative, Mary A. Jensen, and
Inez H. Allred, which Ruling is in favor of the Defendants and Counter-claimants therein.
The property, which may be used to satisfy a judgment, is located in Bountiful, Davis
County, State of Utah, and is described as follows:
Beginning South 100 feet along Relocated Section Line and East 1
rodfromEast quarter corner of Section 20, Township 2 North,
Range \ East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence East 200 feet;
thence South 0 degrees 59' West 160 feet; thence West 200 feet;
thence North 0 degrees 59' East 160 feet to point of beginning.
Property address: 330 North 1300 East, Bountiful, Utah 84010
Tax Serial No. 04-047-0021
The abovementioned property is an asset of the aforementioned Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants, and, any transfer, sale, conveyance, gift, or encumbrance, is subject to the
aforementioned Ruling, rendered in the Fourth Judicial District Court, State of Utah,
Case No. 010400765, and, therefore, any transfer, conveyance, gift or encumbrance may be
considered by the Court to be a violation of the Universal Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act, and
any parties considering any of the abovementioned actions are hereby put on notice.
DATED this 28th day of December, 2004.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Davis

)
)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before^me^n thifVday of December 2004.
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ADDENDUM N

1
2

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

3

STATE OF UTAH

4
5

o]
DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. ALLRED,
Plaintiffs,

6

No. 010400765
Judge Gary D. Stott

7

vs,

8

RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually
and as Trustee for THE RICHARD
MARK ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY
MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST; THE MICHAEL
CHRISTOPHER ALLRED TRUST; THE
STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE
KAREN ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY LEE ALLRED
TRUST; MARY LEE ALLRED as Trustee
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST;
and QWEST CORP.,

9
10
11
12
13
14

Defendants.
15
16

DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION OF:
MARY ALLRED JENSEN

17
18
19

PLACE:
DATE TAKEN:
REPORTER:

333 South Rio Grande, Salt Lake City, Utah
October 16, 2003
KARRI J. JENSEN

20
21
22
REPORTING

SERVICES

INC

23
24

3 3 3 S O U T H RIO G R A N D E

SUITE F

S A L T L A K E CITY UTAH 8 4 1 0 1

25

(801 ) 3 2 8 1 1 8 8 / 1 8 0 0 DEPOMAX
FAX 3 2 8 1 1 8 9

Q.

Was there a document that was prepared?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you know where that document is?

A.

I do.

Q.

Have you provided it to the defense?

A.

I presume it has been provided.
MR. CARLSTON:
MR. ALLRED:

and don!t have it.

I don't know.

We have asked for it a number of times

Will you provide it within the next five

days?
MR. CARLSTON:

I will look and see if we have

provided it.
MR. ALLRED:

We have asked for it in —

MR. CARLSTON:
within a week.

I will certainly respond to you

Five days kind of mixes me up with the

weekends, so a week is -- a week from today.
Q.

(BY MR. ALLRED)

Do you remember who signed the

document?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Who would that have been?

A.

My mother, Inez Allred.

Q.

Was it done, to the best of your recollection,

after the death of David Allred?
A.

I am not sure.

Q.

Good enough.

The dates will tell us.

Have you taken any actions on behalf

30

of the trust since the time you were made trustee?
A.

Meaning.

Q.

Have you signed any papers, filed any papers, taken

any action at all —
A.

No.

Q.

—

on behalf of the trust?

You have signed nothing

as actual trustee?
A.

Other than the .documents of substitution.

Q.

You have not filed any papers or documents on

behalf of the trust?
A.

No.

Q.

Not purchased any property or transferred any

property or anything of that nature?
MR. CARLSTON:

Something that started after the

litigation occurred, what relevance do you think it is to
embark on this line of questioning?

I am trying not to

object here today, but I am having a hard time
understanding

—

MR. ALLRED:

I appreciate that, but I am just

trying to see what has been going on.
MR. CARLSTON:

I know that, but the issue is

whether you have the right to know, and I am trying to
understand the relevance.
MR. ALLRED:

As far as I know, none of the

questions I asked involve any privileged transaction.

I

31

IARV ALLRED JENSEN

ALLRED

J1
Q. Following the death of tfatfd Alfred, he was no
2 longer a trustee. Is that your understanding?
3
A. Yes.
4
Q. What my question is: Have you been designated the
5 actual trustee of this trust at any time subsequent to 1997?
6
A. I am not sure I understand the question.
7
Q. Have you acted - have you acted as a trustee of
8 this trust since 1997?
9
MR. CARLSTON: I object to the extent it calls for
110 a legal conclusion.
11
THE WITNESS: I don!t know what acting like a
12 trustee should be. I guess I am one.
13
Q. (BY MR. ALLRED) Or the successor trustee?
14
A. Right.
15
Q. Have you ever been appointed the actual trustee?
16
A. You mean with somebody dubbing me with a sword or
17 something?
18
Q. Yes.
19
A. I don't know exactly what that means. I only have
20 a document like you have it. I assume I am the actual
21 trustee.
22
Q. What, then, is the status of Inez Alfred?
23
A. She has been substituted.
24
Q. When did that happen?
25
A. Within the last two years.

5 ALLRED
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

118
119
20
21

I 22
23
24
25

1
Was there a document that was prepared?
2
Yes.
3
Do you know where that document is?
I do.
4
5
Have you provided it to the defense?
6
1 presume it has been provided.
MR. CARLSTON: 1 don't know.
7
MR. ALLRED: We have asked for it a number of times 8
and don't have it. Will-you provide it within the next five
9
10
days?
11
MR. CARLSTON: 1 will look and see if we have
12
provided it.
13
MR. ALLRED: We have asked for it in 14
MR. CARLSTON: 1 will certainly respond to you
15
within a week. Five days kind of mixes me up with the
16
weekends, so a week is - a week from today.
Q. (BY MR. ALLRED) Do you remember who signed the 17
18
document?
19
A. Yes.
20
Q. Who would that have been?
21
A. My mother, Inez Allred.
22
Q. Was it done, to the best of your recollection,
23
after the death of David Allred?
24
A. lam not sure. The dates will tell us.
25
Q. Good enough. Have you taken any actions on behalf
30_|_
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

I
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Sheet (8) of (19) i

of the trust since the time you were made trustee?
A. Meaning.
Q. Have you signed any papers, filed any papers, taken
any action at all A. No.
Q. - on behalf of the trust? You have signed nothing
as actual trustee?
A. Other than the documents of substitution.
Q. You have not filed any papers or documents on
behalf of the trust?
A. No.
Q. Not purchased any property or transferred any
property or anything of that nature?
MR. CARLSTON: Something that started after the
litigation occurred, what relevance do you think it is to
embark on this line of questioning? I am trying not to
object here today, but I am having a hard time
understandingMR. ALLRED: I appreciate that, but I am just
trying to see what has been going on.
MR. CARLSTON: I know that, but the issue is
whether you have the right to know, and I am trying to
understand the relevance.
MR. ALLRED: As far as I know, none of the
questions I asked involve any privileged transaction. I
think I have a right to know, and thaf s that.
MR. CARLSTON: I said I will respond within a week,
but I want to understand the relevance of your inquiry here
because this is something that has developed since the
litigation. And I am having trouble understanding why it is
relevant and you would be entitled to it. We may produce it
because of convenience but MR. ALLRED: You can produce it or not. I think it
is very relevant, but I am not going to discuss why I think
it is relevant.
MR. CARLSTON: Well, you might be asked-to later.
Q. (BY MR. ALLRED) Have you at any time personally
discussed with the LDS Foundation the donation of the Provo
property building to the Church?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Have you met with Larry Jenson in regard t o A. I have not.
Q. Have you talked with anyone in regard to the
disposition of the Provo property, should you or the
plaintiffs get it back?
A. Let me be sure I understand. You want to know if I
have talked with anybody about the disposition of the
property should the plaintiffs prevail?
Q. Sure.
A. I am going to carry out my father's wishes and give

D E P O IMAX
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Page 29 to Page 32

ADDENDUM O

1

A.

That's right.

2

Q.

So as regards paragraph number 19, you don't

3

know if there were repeated assertions and overtures, right?

4
5

A.
in our library.

6
7

Q.

Okay.

Now, at the top of the next page it

says, he further represented that the transfer --

8
9

I don't know what you talked about sometime

Mr. Carlston:

Just a minute.

She wasn't

with you and I would like her to follow along.

10

Mr. Allred:

11

Mr. Carlston:
Q.

12

Okay.

(By Mr. Allred)

There you go.

Right there.

At the top of the next page,

13

middle of the line, first sentence.

14

that the transfer of the Provo property of the trust would

15

reduce the income taxes paid by the plaintiffs.
Were your taxes reduced?

16
17

A.

No.

18

Q.

Okay.

19

Further represented

Nothing changed.
That the plaintiffs would remain

entitled to the income from the Provo property.
Do you have any documents or written papers

20
21

that say that you will remain entitled to the income from

22

the Provo property?

23

A.

24

and paying it back.

25

there.

Well, we did all the borrowing of the money
I don't know who else's name should be

We went without what we might do in traveling or
144

I I

A.

I did not.

I was in the hospital.

Q.

Did you ever, in connection with Exhibit 30,

2

J

3

I did you ever appear before a notary public and sign or

4

J swear that you had signed Exhibit 30?

5

A.

No.

Q.

In connection with Exhibit 31, did you ever

6

J

7

I appear before a notary public and ever sign or swear

8

I that you had signed the document which is Exhibit 31?

9

1

10

A.

No.

Because it is dated the 3rd and the

notary is dated the 3rd of February.

A month later.

I realize that, and that wasn f t my question.

11

J

12

I My question was did you ever appear before a notary

13

J public

14
15

J

16

Q.

—

A.

No.

Q.

—

either when you signed it or later, and

swear that you had signed this document?

17

A.

No.

Q.

Do you know the notary public whose name

18

I

19

I appears on Exhibit 30?

20

A.

I do not know.

Q.

Did Richard provide you with any further

21

I

22

I advice as to the manner in which signing these deeds

23

J would reduce your taxes and that of your husband, David?

24

I

A.

He never discussed it with me.

25

I

Q.

And the same question I asked you with
CitiCourt, LLC
(801) 532-3441
9L
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1
2

A.

I the day he presented it to us.

3

Q.

4
5

It would have to be later because that was

Well/ did he present it to you on December

30, 1982?
J

6
7

A.

According to my husband's signature.

Q.

But I f m talking about when it was presented

to you, not presented to your husband.

8

1

9

J there on the 30th. ,

10

A,

I

It wasn't presented to me because I wasn't

Q.

All right.

12

A.

I was --

13

Q*

Now, think about my question.

11

So when did he present it to

you?

14

this question:

15

Exhibit 30, to you?

16

Let's ask

When did Richard present this document,

A.

My husband presented it.

Q.

Okay.

17

J

18

J to you?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

And when was that?

21

A.

It would have to be after that date.

22
23

So your husband, David, presented it

I

don't know when I signed it.
I

Q.

Okay.

Could you tell us what you remember

24

about the circumstances associated with your signing of

25

Exhibit 30?
CitiCourt, LLC
(801) 532-3441

EXHIBIT M

1

Q.

2

A.

3

Finish up.

And then you prepared all these trusts to

Q.
papers?

Was I there and asked you to sign those

Was I there when you personally signed them?

6

Mr. Carlston:

7
8

Go ahead.

nine people.

4
5

(By Mr. Allred)

Q.
I f m sorry.

9

Excuse me.

(By Mr. Allred)

Which papers?

The trust deeds for the --

The quitclaim deeds to the property.

A.

You weren't there when I signed it because I

10

was in the hospital.

11

Q.

Was I there when David signed it?

12

A.

I don't know.

13

Q.

You said - - d o you know or do you not know?

14

A.

I recognize his signature.

15

Q.

17

Do you know whether I was there or not?
Mr. Carlston:

She has already answered that.

She said she didn't know.

19
20

I don't know when

he signed it.

16

18

I guess you were.

The Witness:

You weren't there when I signed

it.

21

Q.

(By Mr. Allred)

22

A.

Because I was in the hospital.

23

Q.

Who was there when you signed it?

24

A.

I suppose when you picked the papers up maybe

All right.

that's -- but if you weren't there, I must have -105

1
2

The Witness:

You had them prepared for us to

sign.

3

Q.

4

sign?

5

signature?

6

(By Mr. Allred)

Who - - g o ahead.

A.

Who presented them to you to

Who presented them to you for your

You left them there for my signature.

When I

7

got out of the hospital I was supposed to sign it.

I signed

8

it for you because you wanted the - - w e wanted the

—

9

Mr. Carlston:

Just a minute.

Go ahead, rattle on.

10

Q.

(By Mr. Allred)

11

A.

We wanted the taxes reduced.

12
13
14

to us.

Just a minute.

That appealed

But they never were reduced.
Q.

You just said I wasn't there when you signed

them when you got out of the hospital, is that correct?

15

A.

Well, you weren't in the hospital with me.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

signed those papers?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

All right.

20

A.

Neither was your notary.

21

Q.

My notary?

22

A.

You had them notarized.

23

Q.

Do you have any personal knowledge that I had

24
25

Were you -- was I there when you

them notarized?
A.

It says on there you had them notarized a
107

Mr. Allred:
counsel.

She supplied the information,

She has already testified to that.
Mr. Carlston:

don't badger the witness.

Please, please, please, just

Ask your question.

Mr. Allred:

What I want to know, is that

statement true or false.
Mr. Carlston:

Mrs. Allred, he wants to know

if you were at the meeting that's referred to in paragraph
29.
The Witness:
Q.

No.

(By Mr. Allred)

Okay.

Now, you talk in line

number three about previous representation and assurances
that he is willing to consider return of the Provo property.
Would you briefly list those returns -- those
representations and assurances and tell me if any of them
were in writing?

What written representations and

assurances did you get from Richard Allred that he was going
to return the property?
A.

You would always give the answer, I can't do

it because of my fiduciaries.
Q.

So I gave the answer that I can't do it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was that always?

A.

Always.

Q.

And I always refused to return it, is that
216

it.
Mr. Carlston:
Mr. Allred:
Q,
basis.

Well, you are misstating it.

Okay.

Let f s go ahead.

Regarding the Provo property on a family

Is that sufficient for you?

When did I ever

encourage you to believe that a resolution could be reached
regarding the Provo property?
A.

Because you -- you always said it wasn't your

idea to have the property, it's your fiduciaries.

You

didn't know what to do with them.
Q.

Did I ever say that I would sign?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

A.

But we were dealing with our own son and we

trusted him.
Mr. Carlston:

Counsel, I have to make a real

quick phone call right at 5 o'clock.
five?

Is it really close to

Can I have just two minutes?
Mr. Allred:

About five minutes to 5.

Mr. Carlston:

Could I just hurry and do

this?
Mr. Allred:

Sure.

Mr. Carlston:

Just a two-minute break.

(Recess taken.)
Mr. Allred:

While we are on the record there
219

the LDS Foundation.
A.

I know it.

Q.

Did they tell you in 1991 that you needed to

have the property transferred back to you?
A.

Yes.

They couldn't complete their plans.

Q.

Did they tell you at that time that you

didn't have legal ownership of the property?
A.

We thought we did because you allowed us to

take care of it for ten years.
Q.
there.

Paragraph 25.

Let's read the first sentence

Can you follow along?
Plaintiff investigated further the 1982 and

1983 quitclaim deeds and eventually discovered for the first
time that Richard Allred had established the Allred Trust in
favor of himself, of his wife, et cetera.
Was that discovery for the first time in
December of 1991 when you met with the LDS Foundation
people?
A.

Well, that's when we went into trouble, when

we couldn't complete our plans.
Q.

I just need a time.

When did you discover

for the first time.
A.

Yes.

Q.

And that was when you met with the LDS

Foundation people?
175

36
1

assistance to you and your husband other than tax

2

returns?

3

A.

He did.

4

Q-

What were some of the other things that he

A.

He put in a sprinkling system.

5
6

did?

7

with our dishwasher installation.

8

our cars.

9

Q.

He helped us

He would help us with

Did Richard provide other servi'ces that you

10

believed were attorney services other than the tax

11

returns?

12

A.

In conversation, like -when I had a car

13

accident, he did what he could to call and find about

14

it; if they were going to reimburse me for the injuries

15

or for the damages.

16
17
18
19
20

Q.

Did you understand that he was acting as

your attorney?
A.

Well, that's the reason I called him,

because he was an attorney^
Q.

All right.

Did Richard provide any services

21

that you thought were attorney services in connection

22

with the Provo property?

23

A.

I can't remember of any services he provided

24

for the Provo property.

25

things.

My husband, David, did those

He was working in connection with Darlene
CitiCourt, LLC
(801) 532-3441

ADDENDUM P

MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577)
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H.
ALLRED,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF INEZ H. ALLRED IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and
as Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK
ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE
MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST;
THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN
JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN
ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED
TRUST. MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST,
and QWEST CORPORATION.
Defendants.

No. 010400765
Judge Anthony W. Schofield

1973 through the present. A copy of the Lease with the subsequent addendum and amendments
is provided in the appendix of documents accompanying my affidavit as Exhibit 1.
8.

With respect to the lease documents described in paragraphs 5-7 above, neither

Richard G. Allred or any of the Trust Defendants had any role or involvement in the either the
negotiation or execution of such documents.
9.

In December 1982, a Quit Claim Deed to part of the Provo Property was recorded

in Utah County. In February 1983, a Quit Claim Deed was recorded in Utah County to the
remainder of the Provo Property. A signature purporting to be mine appears on each of the
deeds. I did not sign the December 1982 deed on December 30, 1982. I was in the hospital at
this time. I never appeared before a notary public and acknowledged signing this deed.
Likewise, I have never appeared before a notary public and acknowledged signing the 1983 deed.
Neither deed was recorded in Provo by my husband, David H. Allred, or at his request.
10.

Under the terms of the Lease in Article VII, Covenants of the Owner, paragraph

(2) at page 9 it provides in part:
To pay punctually, as and when the same shall become due,
any and all taxes, duties, assessments and governmental
impositions, extraordinary as well as ordinary, as shall or '
may be levied or assessed upon, against or with respect to
the demised premises or any portion thereof....
11.

Under Article V, Rental, paragraph (2) required Qwest to then reimburse us for

the taxes paid under Article VII paragraphs (1) and ( 2 ) " . . . within thirty (30) days after receipt of
invoices from Owner supported by receipts for the paid taxes and insurance premiums."
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MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577)
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and
through MARY A. JENSEN, Personal
Representative for the ESTATE OF
DAVID H. ALLRED, and INEZ H.
ALLRED,

or.
AFFIDAVIT OF INEZ H. ALLRED IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and
as Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK
ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE
MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST;
THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN
JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN
ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED
TRUST, MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST,
and QWEST CORPORATION,
Defendants.

No. 010400765
Judge Gary D. Stott

is provided as Exhibit 1 of the appendix of documents accompanying my affidavit.
8.

With respect to the lease documents described in paragraphs 5-7 above, neither

Richard G. Allred or any of the Trust Defendants had any role or involvement in the either the
negotiation or execution of such documents.

in Utah Qatinty. In February 1983, a Quit Claim Deed was recorded in Utah County to the
remainder of the Provo Property. A ^^jmmmmgggg

to be mine appears on e\ch of the
2. I was in thq hospital at

feeds.

/

^this time. I never appeared before a notary public and acknowledged signing t)tfs deed.
ledgfed sijs
Lm^wise, I have never appeared before a notary public and acknowledged
signing the 1983 deed.

K

eSkxrSiCkM

Neither deed was recorde^lffTFSW^
10.

David H. Allred, or at his request.

Under the terms of the Lease in Article VII, Covenants of the Owner, paragraph

(2) at page 9 it provides in part:
To pay punctually, as and when the same shall become due, any
and all taxes, duties, assessments and governmental impositions,
extraordinary as well as ordinary, as shall or may be levied or
assessed upon, against or with respect to the demised premises or
any portion thereof
11.

Under Article V, Rental, paragraph (2) required Qwest to then reimburse us for

the taxes paid under Article VII paragraphs (1) and (2)"... within thirty (30) days after receipt
of invoicesfromOwner supported by receipts for the paid taxes and insurance premiums."
12.

Pursuant to these lease provisionsfromthe commencement of the lease in 1974

through 1986, my husband David H. Allred and I paid the taxes directly and then were

-4-

^

>k*
27.

In the Complaint filed by me and my husband, David H. Allred, there is factual

misstatement that has been pointed out to me by the defendants. In my Complaint, it mistakenly
states that my husband and I attended a family meeting held on November 27, 1998. This is
incorrect. As I clarified at my deposition, David H. Allred and I were not present.
28.

At the hearing on December 17,2002, defendants produced a signature card for a

bank account at USBank. I have reviewed the signature card and the original from which the
copy was made. I made copies of the signature card and the older attached signature cards and '" £X\rla>vu2^
have attached them as Exhibit 15 to the Appendix. They are now designated as Bates Nos. 1714
through 1715. It is clearfromthese copies that the account was in the name of David H. Allred
and Inez H. Allred when it was opened on October 12,1973.
29.

The signature card does not appear to be related to Tracy Collins Bank and Trust

account numbers 0052179-9 or 0052178-1, but was an account formerly with Farmers State
Bank as account number 191321405. The USBank account had been nothing more to me than a
depository for my social security checks and was closed following the death of David H. Allred
when those checks stopped coming. The account was known to me as my "grocery account/'
FURTHER THE AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this J j ^ ^ d a y of March, 2003.

SLOAJUOMUJL

InezH. Allr(v

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this s jT

day of March, 2003.

u/yi&tn—±
My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC
f xfS?^.
-17-
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11§ I (Msm 121 Salt Lfsko City. Utah 84111
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MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577)
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. ALLRED,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and as
Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK ALLRED
TRUST; THE ROBERT MATTHEW
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY MICHELLE
ALLRED TRUST; THE MICHAEL
CHRISTOPHER ALLRED TRUST; THE
STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE
KAREN ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED
TRUST, MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee for
THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST, and
QWEST CORPORATION,

PLAINTIFF INEZ H. ALLRED'S
RESPONSES TO THE FIRST SET OF
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS OF
DEFENDANTS RICHARD G.
ALLRED, THE ALLRED TRUSTS,
AND MARY LEE ALLRED

No. 010400765
Judge Anthony W. Schofield

Defendants.

Plaintiff Inez H. Alired responds to Defendants Richard G. Alired, the Alired Trusts, and
Mary Lee Allred's First Set of Request for Admissions as follows:

bears the signature of and was signed by David H. Allred. (Refer to Plaintiffs Deposition
Exhibit Number 45)
RESPONSE: See Response to Request No. 20.
REQUEST NO. 29: Admit that the Quit-Claim Deed dated December 30,1982, stamped
number 32615 by the Utah County Clerk, was signed by Inez H. Allred. (Refer to Plaintiffs
Deposition Exhibit Number 30).
RESPONSE: Inez H. Allred objects to Request No. 29 on the basis that it assumes facts
not in evidence that have not been admitted, specifically that Exhibit No. 30 represents a binding
"Quit-Claim Deed" that was intended to legally and equitably, and for all intents and purposes,
transfer property from plaintiffs to those persons and/or entities named therein, and that the
stated date "December 30, 1982/' actually represents a date related to any signatures found
thereon. These assertions are denied. Subject to and without waiving any objections, Inez H.
Allred admits that the referenced Exhibit No. 30 appears to bear a signature and that the signature
appears to be like that of Inez H. Allred. Inez H. Allred, based upon her best recollection and
information, does not believe that she signed Exhibit No. 30. On December 30,1982, Inez H.
Allred was in the hospital and was unavailable to sign any documents. Moreover, Inez H. Allred
denies that she appeared in front of a notary and that the notary statement is accurate. She asserts
that to the extent it may be shown that she did in fact sign Exhibit No. 30, her signature was
obtained based upon Richard G. Allred's representations that the document was for tax purposes
only and was not to indicate any intention to transfer title or any interest in the Provo Property
from the plaintiffs to the named entity or person.

-12o /

RESPONSE: Inez H. Allred objects to defendants' reference and reliance on Bates No.
771 for the reasons set forth in her response to Request No. 46. Moreover, this Request is vague
and ambiguous as to when "the telephone company had 'been instructed

" Notwithstanding

the above, Inez H. Allred acknowledges the quoted phrase "been instructed to divide the returns
of the contract and any additional option exercised to each of the above accounts" is from Bates
No. 771 and that the only accounts that appear to be referenced in Bates No. 771 are Account 2131418-2 and Account 0052179-9. It is not known whether Bates No. 771 is a complete
document or is accurate. Indeed, Bates No. 771 refers to a letter from Darlene Nelson, assistant
manager-real estate, for Mountain Bell, dated February 4,1987, to David H. Allred, that
indicates that Bates No. 771 "must be read in cooperation with Darlene Nelson's letter to me
dated February 4,1987 . . . . " The letter from Darlene Nelson, Bates Nos. 808-9, and Bates No.
771 are not consistent in material ways. For example, Ms. Nelson's letter states that the funds
"they will continue going to Tracy Collins Bank & Trust

" In Bates No. 771, some of the

funds purportedly were going to a Zions' Bank account.
DATED this / / f j ( day of August, 2002.
INEZ H. ALLRED

In& H. Allred
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this / / ^ a y of August, 2002.

MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577)
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H.
ALLRED,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and
as Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK
ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE
MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST;
THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN
JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN
ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED
TRUST, MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST,
and QWEST CORPORATION,
Defendants.

ERRATA REGARDING PLAINTIFFS'
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

No. 010400765
Judge Anthony W. Schofield

Upon review of their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment, plaintiffs Inez H. Allred and David H. Allred ("Plaintiffs") submit the following errata
corrections to their memorandum (corrections in bold):
1.

In plaintiffs' numbered paragraph four in Opposition to Defendants' Statement of

Undisputed Facts, plaintiffs made statements regarding the signatures of plaintiffs on the nine
trusts. Upon review, plaintiffs recognize that their opposition found in paragraph number four
should be as follows:
Plaintiffs oppose the facts set forth in paragraph 7 of Defendants'
Statement of Undisputed Facts on the basis that Inez H. Allred testified
that she never signed neither Quit Claim Deed in front of a Notary.
See July 1,2002 deposition of Inez H. Allred at 98 (Exhibit 10,
Appendix of documents in Opposition to Summary Judgment
("Appendix")). Plaintiffs, on page 6 at Wf21-22 of Plaintiffs'
Complaint, acknowledged that Inez H. Allred and David H. Allred
signed the two Quit Claim Deeds.
2.

Upon review of paragraph six of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Statement

of Undisputed Facts, Plaintiffs recognize that it should read as follows:
Plaintiffs oppose the facts set forth in paragraph 14 of Defendants'
Statement of Undisputed Facts on the basis that the cited testimony is
unclear and confusing whether Richard G. Allred was present when
David H. Allred allegedly signed the Quit Claim Deed. In a letter
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Be it remembered that on the 1st day of July,
2002, the deposition of Inez Allred, produced as a witness
herein at the instance of the Allred defendants herein, in
the above-entitled action now pending in the above-named
court, was taken before Dawn M. Davis, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
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office of Snow, Christensen and Martineau, 10 Exchange
Place, Suite 1100, Salt Lake City, Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to
Notice.
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The Witness:
Q.

Okay.

(By Mr. Allred)

That document you are

looking at is the signature page purporting to the original
copy of the Stephen James Allred Trust.

Is that your

signature affixed on that page?
A.

It looks like my signature, but I didn't

place it there.
Q.

Okay.

You have never seen that document

before, is that right?
A.

No, I have never seen it.

Q.

Does it appear to be David H. Allred f s?

A.

Yes, it appears.

Q.

Does it appear to be notarized with a raised

notary stamp and signed by a notary?
A.

The nptary -- see, I have never seen this.

I

don't -- I guess -Q.

I am not asking you if you saw it.

I am just

asking you if it appears it is notarized and if there is a
raised, embossed -A.

Yes, it looks as if she has notarized the

signature of a woman who was in the hospital.
Mr. Allred:
Mr. Carlston:
this.

That's fine.
One matter before you leave

Your question was -- you asked her if she had ever

seen it before and I believe you mean in -- had ever seen it
52

Reporterf s Certificate
State of Utah

)
)

ss.

County of Salt Lake)

I, Dawn M. Davis, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public for the
State of Utah, do hereby certify:
That the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at
the time and place set forth herein; that the witness was
duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth; and that the proceedings were taken down by
me in shorthand and thereafter transcribed into typewriting
under my direction and supervision;
That the foregoing pages contain a true and correct
transcription of my said shorthand notes so taken.
In witness whereof, I have subscribed my name and
affixed my seal this /ffw^day of

KA/lMW

2002.

Notary Public
My commission expires:
April 15, 2004

\.; * * * *y

NOTARY PUBLIC
DAWN M DAVIS
1205 NORTH FAIRWAY
FARMINGTON, UT 84025
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES
APRIL 15TH 2004
STATE Of UTAH
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ADDENDUM Q

RICHARD G. ALLRED (0059)
1660 W. Broadway, Suite 302
Anaheim, California 92802
(714) 585-5559, (801) 295-6801
Attorney for Richard Allred,
Individually and as Trustee.
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and
through MARY A. JENSEN, Personal
Representative for the ESTATE OF
DAVID H. ALLRED, and INEZ H. ALLRED,
Plaintiffs,
v.
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually
and as Trustee for THE RICHARD
MARK ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY
MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST; THE MICHAEL
CHRISTOPHER ALLRED TRUST; THE
STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE
KAREN ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED
TRUST; MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST;
and QWEST CORPORATION,
Defendants,

RICHARD G. ALLRED and MARY LEE ALLRED,
Counter-claimants,
vs.
DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and through
MARY A. JENSEN, Personal representative for
the Estate of DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H.
ALLRED, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Counter-defendants.

I.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR AN ORDER
QUIETING TITLE

II.

DEFENDANTS'MOTION
FOR THE REMOVAL OF
LIS PENDENS

III. DEFENDANTS'MOTION
FOR A COURT
DETERMINATION OF
OWNERSHIP OF A
"SLIVER" OF LAND
IN CONJUNCTION WITH
THE PROVO PROPERTY
Civil No. 010400765
Judge Gary D. Stott

^Birs, assignees, trustees, personal representatives, etc., therefore removing the cloud of title
found upon the Provo Property, at the present time.
As the Court is aware, this Court has, on numerous occasions, spoken from the bench as
well as by written order, stating that the Provo Property is owned by the Allred Trusts and has
been so for many years.
Likewise, the Allred Trusts are entitled to the income therefrom. Although these
statements effectively, for all intents and purposes, establish Quiet Title in the name of the Allred
Trusts, it would be well, for filing with the Utah County Recorder, to have an Order Quieting
Title.
Thus, Petitioners request said Order Quieting Title be issued by the Court.
II.

LIS PENDENS

As the Court is aware, Section 78-40-2 of the Utah Code, allows the filing of a Lis
Pendens.
Section 78-40-2.5 states as follows:
"...[2] Anytime, after a notice has been recorded, pursuant to Section 78-40-2 any
of the following may make a motion to the court in which the action is pending to
release the notice: (a) A party to the action; (b) A person with an interest in the
property effected by the notice.
[3] The court shall order a notice released if: (a) The court receives a motion to
release under Subsection [2]; and (b) The court finds that the claimant has not
established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real
property claim that is the subject of the notice.
[4] If the court releases a notice pursuant to this section, the claimant may not
record another notice with respect to the same property without approval of the
court in which the action is pending.
[5] Upon a motion by any person with an interest in the real property that is the

/ / ^ /

subject of a notice, a court may require the claimant to give the moving party a
guarantee as a condition of maintaining the notice: (a) Any time after a notice has
been recorded; and (b) Regardless of whether the court has received an application
to release under Subsection [2].
[6] A person who receives a guarantee under Subsection [5] may recover an
amount not to exceed the amount of the guarantee upon a showing that: (a) The
claimant did not prevail on the real property claim; and (b) The person seeking the
guarantee suffered damages as a result of the maintenance of the notice.
[7] A court shall award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party on any motion
under this section unless the court finds that: (a) The non-prevailing party acted
with substantial justification; or (b) Other circumstances make the imposition of
attorney fees and costs unjust."
Defendants herein, are at this time, making a motion for the removal of the Lis Pendens
filed by the Plaintiffs, attached hereto, [Exhibit D], and are requesting that the Court order the Lis
Pendens removed. The Court, has, on many occasions, stated that the Provo Property is owned
by the Allred Trusts and that the Plaintiffs have not shown colorable claim to the property.
Thus, a Lis Pendens is not justified, since Plaintiffs have shown no viable, potential claim
to the property in any way. Or, in the alternative, Plaintiffs should be required to post a bond,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-40-2.5 as previously enunciated.
III. DETERMINATION OF OWNERSHIP OF SLIVER OF LAND
CONVEYED BY QUIT CLAIM DEED BY PROVO CITY IN 1974
Some confusion has risen as to the disposition and ownership of a small, small sliver of
land conveyed to David H. Allred and Inez H. Allred on April 16, 1974 by the City of Provo,
Utah. It would appear that this sliver of land was directly adjacent to the newly constructed
public road in front of the Provo Property. Indeed, the deed says on its face:
"The intent of this deed is to convey to Mr. Allred a triangular shaped sliver
of ground over which his fence line encroaches into 1325 South Street."
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MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577)
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H.
ALLRED,
LIS PENDENS
Plaintiffs,
vs.

No.
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and
as Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK
ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE
MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST;
THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN
JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN
ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED
TRUST, MARY LEE ALLRED, as
Trustee for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED
TRUST, and QWEST CORPORATION,
Defendants.

Judge

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that there is an action in the above-entitled court, the
object and purpose of which is to quiet title to the real property located at 475 East 1325 South,
Provo, Utah County, Utah, which is more particularly described as follows:
Commencing at a point on the north side of 1325 South Street,
Provo, Utah, and the southeast corner of Commercial Tire
Company's property, which point is south 289.5 feet and east
1504.71 feet from the northwest corner of section 18, township 7
south, range 3 east, Salt Lake base and meridian; then north 0°.
15 minutes east 526.0 feet; then south 89° 10 minutes east 414.0
feet; then south 0° 50 minutes west 526.0 feet; thence north 89°
10 minutes west 414.0 feet to the place of beginning.
DATED this / 5 ( i a y of February, 2001.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By/^£tS
Michael R. Carlston
Kenneth L. Reich
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

-t^

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this \*Q day of February, 2001,
by Kenneth L. Reich.
NOTARY PUBLIC
JEAN T. LAYTON

N:\20874U\Lis pcndens.wid

10 Exchange Race, 11th Fir
Salt Lake City, Utah 64111
My Commission Expires
December 2, 2002

STATE OF UTAH

-2-

17//9

